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Recent years have seen the rapid development of many emerging technologies
in various aspects of computer engineering, such as new devices, new fabrication
techniques of integrated circuits (IC), new computation frameworks, etc. In this
dissertation, we study the security challenges to these emerging technologies as well
as the security opportunities they bring. Specifically, we investigate the security
opportunities in double patterning lithography, the security challenges in physical
unclonable functions, and security issues in machine learning.
Double patterning lithography (DPL) is an emerging fabrication technique
for ICs. We study the security opportunities that DPL brings at the layout level.
DPL is used to set up two independent mask development lines which do not need
to share any information. Under this setup, we consider the attack model where
the untrusted employee(s) who has access to only one mask may try to infer the
entire circuit design or insert additional malicious circuitry into the design. As a
countermeasure, we customize DPL to decompose the layout into two sub-layouts in
such a way that each sub-layout individually exposes minimum information about
the other and hence protects the entire layout from any untrusted personnel.
Physical unclonable functions (PUF) are a type of circuits for which each
copy (of the same circuit structure) has a unique and unpredictable functionality.
The unpredictable behavior is caused by the manufacturing variations of electronic
devices. However, for many state-of-the-art PUF designs, we show that the device
variations can be estimated using an optimization-theoretic formulation and hence
the PUF’s input-output behavior becomes predictable. Simulations show a sub-
stantial reduction in attack complexity compared to previously proposed machine
learning based attacks.
Neural network (NN) is an emerging computation framework for machine
learning (ML). It is increasingly popular for system developers to use pre-trained NN
models instead of training their own because training is painstaking and sometimes
requires private data. We call these pre-trained neural models neural intellectual
properties (IP). Neural IPs raise multiple security concerns. On the one hand,
as the IP user does not know about the training process, it is crucial to ensure
the integrity of the neural IP. To this end, we investigate possible hidden malicious
functionality, i.e., neural Trojans, that can be embedded into neural IPs and propose
effective mitigation techniques. On the other hand, the neural IP owner may want
to protect the NN model from reverse engineering attacks. However, it has been
shown that hardware side-channels can be exploited to decipher the structure of
neural networks. We propose both a novel attack approach based on cache timing
side-channel and a defensive memory access mechanism.
NNs also raise challenges to conventional hardware security techniques. Specif-
ically, we focus on its challenge to logic locking, a strong key-based protection
of hardware IP against untrusted foundries by injecting incorrect behavior into
the digital functionality when the key is incorrect. We formally prove a trade-off
between the amount of injected error and the complexity of Boolean satisfiability
(SAT)-based attacks to find the correct key. Due to the inherent error resiliency
of NNs, state-of-the-art logic locking schemes fail to inject enough error to derail
NN-based applications while maintaining exponential SAT complexity. To fix this
issue, we propose a novel secure and effective logic locking scheme, called Strong
Anti-SAT (SAS), to lock the hardware and make sure that the NN modes undergo
significant accuracy loss when any wrong key is applied.
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1.1 Security and Trust Issues in the IC Supply Chain
Many security issues have been raised in the globalized supply chain of in-
tegrated circuits (IC). We illustrate the supply chain and the security concerns
in Fig. 1.1. For example, many companies sell intellectual properties (IP) to IC
designers where the IP becomes a part of the IC design. In this case, the IP owner
may wish to keep the design details of the IP as a secret and protect their IP from
piracy by the IC designer or later stages of the supply chain. The same concern
applies to the IC designers who do not own a foundry and outsource their designs
for fabrication since the foundry is not under the designer’s control and can be
potentially untrusted. On the other hand, and the IC designer wants to verify the
integrity of the IP and make sure that there are not malicious back doors. System
manufacturers also have this concern when they deploy a chip that is bought from
the open market in their systems.
1.1.1 The IP/IC Design Protection Problem
In the IC supply chain outlined in Fig. 1.1, the foundry knows every detail of
the IC layout but is not in the designer’s control. Therefore, the foundry is usually


















































A sends its product to B
A has a security concern  
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Figure 1.1: An overview of IC supply chain and the security and trust issues
complete information about the design to be manufactured. Therefore, it is crucial
for the designer to protect the design from the possible attacks carried out by such
informed adversaries. The following attacks are possible:
• IC Overbuilding: The foundry may fabricate more copies of the IC than it
is supposed to. The foundry may sell the overbuilt ICs directly into the open
market and harm the designer’s interest.
• IP Piracy: The adversary is able to obtain the gate-level netlists of the design
(i.e., hardware IPs) by reverse-engineering the layout provided by the designer.
The gate-level netlists are the details of the functionality of the circuit which
the attacker may resale or reuse.
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1.1.2 The Integrity Problem
When the designer receives an IP from the IP suppliers, he/she wants to
ensure the integrity of the IP. Likewise, the fabricated ICs from the foundry may
also be examined to make sure that no malicious modifications were made to the
original IC design. These malicious modifications in IPs or ICs are usually called
Hardware Trojans (HT). HTs are usually hidden and only affect the outcome of
the circuit under rare circumstances. When an HT is triggered, the output of the
circuit deviates substantially from the correct output. Otherwise, the circuit works
correctly. This makes the harms of HTs severe and the detection difficult.
1.2 Focus of this Dissertation
In recent years, these hardware security and trust issues are becoming more
complicated with the emergence of new technologies. These technologies are found
in all the levels, from the physical level to the application level. For example,
at the physical level, new fabrication technologies make the continuing scaling of
semiconductor devices possible. At the device and circuit levels, new circuit designs
that contain new devices provide many new desirable properties. At the application
level, new computation frameworks have achieved much better performance on
many tasks than state-of-the-art conventional algorithms. While most of these
technologies are initially intended to overcome the drawbacks of their conventional
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counterparts, they also come with a wide spectrum of implications on security
including both opportunities and challenges. In this work, we investigate three
specific problems at the intersection of security and emerging technologies:
1. Security opportunities in double patterning lithography (DPL), a new fabri-
cation technology.
2. An attack against physical unclonable functions (PUF), a new type of circuit
used for security.
3. Various security issues in neural networks (NN), a new computation framework
that has been receiving a lot of interest in recent years.
1.2.1 Security Opportunities in Double Patterning Lithog-
raphy
Although the foundries are not controlled by the designer, it might not be
fair to assume the foundry as an untrusted black box. Indeed, many foundries
have developed trusted fabrication lines [64, 1] where the foundries will have legal
obligations to prevent any security risk. However, untrusted individual employees
may exist and try to steal the IP or insert Trojans into the design. In our work, we
take advantage of double patterning lithography (DPL), an emerging IC fabrication
technology. When DPL is used, the layout is decomposed into two sub-layouts
for mask development. Each sub-layout satisfies the shape spacing requirement
which is specified by the fabrication technology node. Each sub-layout is processed
in an independent mask production line. We further assume that there is no
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collusion between employees on different lines. In addition to satisfying the process
requirement, the objective of our DPL includes ensuring minimum information
leakage about the entire circuit from individual sub-layouts. We define a measure
of “distance” between the original layout and a sub-layout in order to quantify the
information leakage. By decomposing in a way that maximizes the smaller distance
between the one of the sub-layouts to the original layout, we ensure that minimum
information about the original layout is leaked to the attacker no matter which
sub-layout he/she has access to. We formulate an optimization-theoretic problem
to determine how to partition the layout.
1.2.2 Security Issues with Physical Unclonable Functions
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are a type of circuits for which each
copy (with exactly the same circuitry) has a unique and unpredictable functionality.
This uniqueness comes from the manufacturing variations of electronic devices. The
unique functionality of the PUF is characterized by the its input-output behavior:
(i) for different PUF copies, the output according to the same input should be
independent; (ii) for the same PUF, the output to different inputs should be inde-
pendent. We call the PUF input as the “challenge”, output as “response”, and the
input-output behavior as “challenge-response pair (CRP)”. A typical application of
the PUF is authentication. We give an illustrative authentication example as follows.
In this scenario, the verifier wants to tell if the remote chip (which has a PUF inside)
is authentic. We suppose that the verifier is the chip designer and has recorded a
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large number of the PUF’s CRPs before selling the chip. During authentication,
the verifier (usually a server) sends a set of challenges to the remote device (who
claims to have an authentic chip). In return, the remote device sends the PUF’s
responses to these challenges. If the responses are all correct, the authentication
will be successful. As the PUF’s response to each challenge is independent, for an
n-bit input PUF, there are 2n unique CRPs and the used CRPs need not be reused
if n is large enough. This authentication protocol can be used in other scenarios
such as verifying the authenticity of the edge devices in the Internet of things. It
can also help the chip designer identify pirate/overbuilt copies in the market.
In this dissertation, the attack on PUFs, i.e., to predict the PUF’s responses
to unknown challenges, is studied. We formulate a novel optimization-theoretic
attacking approach and apply this attack on multiple types of PUFs. We found
that our approach substantially reduces the complexity of the attack compared to
conventional machine learning based attack.
1.2.3 Security Threats in Neural Networks
In recent years, neural networks (NN) have been an emerging computation
framework that outperforms conventional methods on many tasks. As the perfor-
mance of NNs continues improving, they are becoming larger and deeper as well.
As a result, training the networks is becoming more and more expensive in terms of
both time and computation resources. Therefore, it becomes increasingly worthwhile
to buy a neural network intellectual property (IP) from a third party instead of
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training one from scratch by oneself. The ramifications of such a supply chain shift
on security is two fold. On the one hand, the neural IP buyer may be concerned
about the integrity of the neural IP. On the other hand, the neural IP vendor may
wish to only allow the buyer to use the IP without disclosing the underlying neural
network model. In this case, reverse engineering attacks on neural networks is of the
neural IP vendor’s concern. In addition, due to the inherent error resilience of neural
network models, error injection-based hardware IP protection schemes, such as logic
locking [16], need to inject a higher amount of error in order to corrupt a neural
network-based application. This will cause vulnerability to Boolean satisfiability
(SAT)-based attacks [102], as we prove in this dissertation. There are the three
aspects we focus on regarding the security of neural networks in this dissertation:
1. Neural Trojans: the malicious functionality that can be embedded in a neural
IP.
2. Reverse engineering attacks on neural networks via hardware side-channels
and countermeasures.
3. A novel logic locking scheme that has high application-level effects on neural
network-based applications while maintaining high complexity against SAT-
based attacks.
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1.3 Contribution and Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 presents the opportunities in layout-level obfuscation brought by
DPL. We introduce the trusted foundry and untrusted employee (TFUE) model and
develop a specialized version of DPL to thwart the attacks from untrusted employees.
Chapter 3 provides a novel optimization-theoretic attack on PUFs. Compared
to existing machine learning-based attack, on average, our attack approach reduces
the required PUF queries by 66% and takes 79.8% less time to achieve the same
PUF response prediction accuracy.
In Chapter 4, we identify and demonstrate the threats of neural Trojans and
propose countermeasures including input anomaly detection, retraining, and input
preprocessing. Experiments show each countermeasure effective.
In Chapter 5, we theoretically prove a universal trade-off among all logic
locking schemes between the hardware-level error injected by the locking circuitry
and the complexity of SAT-based attacks. In order to protect hardware running
neural network-based applications, which usually tend to be error-resilient, and
maintain high SAT complexity, a novel logic locking scheme, called Strong Anti-SAT
(SAS), is proposed. SAS achieves high application-level error injection effects while
maintaining high SAT complexity.
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We propose a cache side-channel based reverse engineering attack on neural
networks in Chapter 6. Our attack specifically focuses on the structure of neural
networks. Compared to existing approaches, our attack technique eliminates the
need of shared main memory between the attacker and victim processes and achieve
more accurate reverse engineering results.
In Chapter 7, we consider an even stronger attacker of neural network reverse
engineering and provide a countermeasure based on various techniques including
oblivious shuffle, address space layout randomization, and dummy memory accesses.
We are able to exponentially increase the neural network structure search space.
Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation and discusses our future research plans.
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Chapter 2: Security Opportunities in
Double Patterning Lithography
In this chapter, we explore how to improve the security of proprietary design
details of integrated circuit (IC) during fabrication brought by double patterning
lithography (DPL). Specifically, we introduce the trusted foundry and untrusted
employee (TFUE) model and develop a specialized version of DPL to thwart the
attacks from an untrusted employee.
Almost all the previous studies on IC supply chain security label off-site
foundries as untrusted. To thwart the attacks mentioned in Section 1.1 by untrusted
foundries such as Trojan insertion, IC piracy, etc., countermeasures such as including
logic obfuscation, split manufacturing, and post fabrication editing based approaches
have been proposed [87, 81, 117, 93, 45]. Among these countermeasures, obfuscation
based approaches suffer from various reverse-engineering-based attacks [102, 17],
split manufacturing still requires a trusted foundry to fabricate some metal layers
which incurs the cost of maintaining such a foundry. In 3D/2.5D integration tech-
nology, different dice manufactured by different foundries may not align well which
reduces the yield. Post fabrication editing has to be done chip-by-chip and reduces
the reliability of the chip and suffers from low efficiency.
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In real-world scenarios, however, the “untrusted foundry” assumption may not
be accurate. On one hand, the foundries are not necessarily incentivized to perform
these attacks due to legal and financial liabilities. One the other hand, even for
the foundries conventionally considered as trusted (e.g. owned by the designer),
there can be rogue employees who has the ability to perform the attacks. Under
the TFUE model, we try to secure the IC manufacturing process from the foundry’s
perspective.
2.1 Fundamentals of Double Patterning Lithography
In this section, we briefly introduce the principles of DPL. In the lithography
step of IC fabrication, the minimum distance between two adjacent polygons in
the layout is physically constrained by the wavelength of the light used in the
lithography. We call this distance the minimum feature spacing, denoted as λ. The
technology node of IC has scaled down to a point where λ can no longer provide
enough resolution as required by the technology node. In order to continue the
scaling of transistors, DPL has been developed.
DPL requires that the layout be decomposed into two sub-layouts, each of
which satisfies the minimum spacing constraint. A mask based on each sub-layout is
made in an independent mask development line. How each sub-layout is processed
in its mask development line is Similar to how an entire layout is processed, the
sub-layouts need to be edited to ensure that the masks are compatible with the
foundry’s fabrication process. After the masks are made, in the lithography stage,
11
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 2.1: The steps of layout decomposition. (a): the original layout; (b): layout
fracturing; (c): graph construction; (d): node splitting; (e): color assignment
there are two lithography steps, each putting one sub-layout onto the silicon wafer.
After the two lithography steps, the fabricated IC will be the same as the original
layout.
Layout decomposition algorithms that make each sub-layout satisfy the spac-
ing constraint have been well developed. We describe the state-of-the-art layout
decomposition algorithm proposed by Kahng et al. [48]. The layout of an IC is
composed of rectilinear polygons. Each rectilinear polygon is called a “feature”.
The algorithm consists of layout fracturing, graph construction, node splitting, and
graph update. These steps are illustrated in Fig. 2.1 and explained below.
1. Layout fracturing. In this step, any feature (rectilinear polygon) that is not
a rectangle is partitioned into multiple rectangles. For example, in Fig. 2.1a,
the upper right features is split into two rectangles as shown in Fig. 2.1b.
Note that there can be more than one possible way to split a feature.
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2. Graph construction: In this step, the conflict graph is built. In the conflict
graph, each node represents a rectangle in the layout. An edge connecting
a pair of nodes exists if the distance between the corresponding rectangles is
smaller than λ. This indicates that the two rectangles cannot be on the same
mask. A sample conflict graph is shown in Fig. 2.1c.
3. Node splitting: As an edge indicates a conflict, a node coloring problem
can be formulated as follows. The nodes in the conflict graph need to be
colored with two colors in a way that opposite colors must be assigned to
two adjacent nodes (i.e., those connected with an edge). Therefore, if any
odd-length cycle exists in the conflict graph, the node coloring problem will
have no feasible solution, i.e., indicating that there is a conflict which must
be resolved in order to get a feasible layout decomposition. An example of
such a conflict is illustrated in Fig. 2.1c where we find a 5-node cycle. There
is no feasible assignment of colors that will satisfy the constraint. In order to
resolve this conflict, one node within the odd-length cycle needs to be split
into two, indicating the splitting of a rectangle.
4. Graph update and color assignment: A new conflict graph is constructed
based on the splitting. One possible way of splitting and the updated conflict
graph is shown in Fig. 2.1d. Colors can be assigned when there is no more
odd-length cycles in the graph. Fig. 2.1e gives one feasible color assignment.
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How the color is often formulated as an integer linear programming (ILP)
problem in [48] where the ILP focused on improving the yield of chips by
enforcing the following criteria:
(a) Penalizing design rule violations
(b) avoiding assigning different colors in the same polygon (“stiches”).
(c) Other factors that may improve the yield.
2.2 TFUE: the Trusted Foundry and Untrusted Employee
Model
In this section, we justify the TFUE model [55, 104]. We discuss why this
model is more realistic than assuming every foundry to be either completely trusted
or completely untrusted.
• It is indeed risky for a foundry to undermine or counterfeit the IC designs
massively. If this is noticed by the designer, the foundry will have legal troubles
and lose business in the future. Every foundry wants a larger market share
and may not risk this. Instead, even the foundries conventionally assumed
untrusted, including offshore foundries, want the designers to trust their in-
tegrity. Bloom et al. proposed a way that allows the designer to attest the
integrity of the foundry machinery and the produced chips to ensure their
integrity [11]. The foundries’ security policies and enforcement can also be
reviewed by the designer and/or a licensed third party.
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• Foundries that are conventionally assumed as trusted are not necessarily free
from the risk of untrusted employees. There can be employees who collude
with the foundry’s or the designer’s competitors who aim at undermining the
fabricated chips or pirating the design. In this case, even a conventionally
trusted foundry still need security measures against untrusted employees.
Due to the above reasons, we identify the foundry employees as the source of
security threats in a foundry. We no longer classify the foundries into trusted ones
and untrusted ones. Instead, we use TFUE as our primary assumption.
The following sections will present the threat model under TFUE and coun-
termeasures utilizing DPL. In the next section, we will explain what an untrusted
foundry employee can can do to undermine the IC supply chain security and explore
the opportunities made possible by DPL to obfuscate the layout-level design details
and defend the attacks.
2.3 Threat Model and Countermeasure under TFUE
2.3.1 Threat Model
We consider the threat model and countermeasures in the context of DPL since
DPL is necessary for state-of-the-art technology nodes. The layout decomposition
process can be automated, no employee needs to access the entire layout obtained
from the designer before the decomposition. Secure machinery is used to decompose
the layout into two sub-layouts. The two sub-layouts are then developed in two
independent mask production lines by two independent groups of employees. The
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Figure 2.2: The attack model in the context of DPL under TFUE
independent mask production lines do not share any layout information. We further
assume that there is no collusion between the employees on different lines. Each
sub-layout is edited in its line to ensure that the mask is manufacturable. However,
when an employee edits the sub-layout, he/she has the ability to perform various
attacks such as Trojan insertion and piracy. In this context, we assume the following
about the attacker:
• The attacker who is an employee of the foundry who works on one of the
independent mask production lines. His/her knowledge about the entire IC
design is limited to the what is on the sub-layout processed by that line.
• There is no collusion between employees on different lines.
• Although the employee’s job is to edit the sub-layout to improve the manu-
facturability of the mask, he/she can actually make any change to the layout.
• The attacker may try to recover the original layout from the sub-layout that
he/she works on and steal the entire chip design.
This attack model is illustrated in Fig. 2.2.
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2.3.2 Countermeasure Formulation
the attacker needs to know to some extent about the original layout in order
to insert Trojans into or counterfeit the IC design. In the attack model we consider,
such knowledge is based on the inspection into one sub-layout. Intuitively, each
sub-layout should look as ’different’ as possible from the original layout in order
to leak minimum information about the original layout. We will define a metric
of “distance” between two layout images, based on which we propose a variant of
layout decomposition algorithm which maximizes the minimum distance between
each sub-layout and the original layout.
We follow the following convention of notations: lower case letters denote
scalars (normal) and vectors (bold), and capital ones denote matrices. For example,
x is a scalar, x is a vector and X is a matrix. We use lower scripts to denote the
indices of vectors and matrices. A comprehensive list of symbols is given in Table
2.1. The symbols will be explained again when used in equations.
Our proposed countermeasure is a customized layout decomposition algorithm
which follows the one specified in Section 2.1 up to node splitting until every conflict
is resolved. We customize the color (sub-layout) assignment algorithm. We consider
the layout of the design as a binary image. For each pixel in the image, its value is
1 it resides on a feature and the value is 0 otherwise.
In order to evaluate the distance between two images, we need a metric of
“distance” in the first place. We use their difference in the frequency domain to
characterize the distance. We transform the layout images using 2-dimensional
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Table 2.1: List of symbols
Symbol and domain Meaning
λ ∈ R++ the minimum feature spacing
n the number of rectangles in the layout
G = (V,E) the conflict graph
V = {ck|k = 1, . . . , n} the set of nodes (rectangles) in the conflict graph
E {(cu, cv)| the distance between cu and cv ≤ λ}
p ∈ Z++ the number of elements in each row and column of the
Fourier coefficient matrices
F l ∈ Cp×p, l = 0, 1, 2 the Fourier coefficient matrix of the FFT of the
layout, with l = 0, 1, 2 corresponding to the original
layout, the first sub-layout, and the second sub-layout,
respectively
F̃ k ∈ Cp×p, k = 1, . . . , n the Fourier coefficient matrix of the FFT of the k-th
rectangle’s layout.
sl, l = 1, 2 the distance between the original layout and sub-
layout l
x ∈ {0, 1}n the vector indicating the sub-layout that each rectan-
gle belongs to, where xk = 1 if rectangle ck is assigned
to the first sub-layout, and xk = 0 if ck is assigned to
the second sub-layout
x̄ ∈ {0, 1}n = 1− x
Al, l = 0, 1, 2 the real parts of F l
Ãk, k = 1, . . . , n the real parts of F̃ k
Bl, l = 0, 1, 2 the imaginary parts of F l
B̃k, k = 1, . . . , n the imaginary parts of F̃ k
α(ij) ∈ Rn α(ij) = (Ã1ij , Ã2ij , . . . , Ãnij)T
















Let F 0, F 1 and F 2 be the Fourier coefficient matrices of the original layout
and the two sub-layouts, respectively. Similar to the 1D-FFT, the linear property
also holds for the 2D-FFT, i.e.,
F 0 = F 1 + F 2





i, j = 1, . . . , p. As the (sub-)layout comprises of multiple rectangles, its 2D-FFT



















Definition 2.1 (Distance). The distance between two binary images is defined as









|F 0ij − F lij|2 (2.1)
where s1 and s2 stand for the distances between the first/second sub-layout and the
original layout, respectively. As we mentioned earlier, the distance is a measure of
the attacker’s difficulty to infer the entire layout from a sub-layout. Therefore, a
larger difference indicates more security and it is desirable to partition the layout
such that both distances are large, i.e., no matter which sub-layout the attacker
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can access, he/she always has great difficulties to attack. However, there may be
a trade-off between the two distances. Considering this, the objective should be


















Note that each Fourier coefficient is a complex number. The relationship between the
magnitudes of the coefficient and its real and imaginary parts is |F lij|2 = (Alij)2 +
(Blij)
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tions give us each 2D-FFT coefficient, including the real and imaginary parts, of
























α(ij)α(ij)T + β(ij)β(ij)T (2.3)





|F 2ij|2 = x̄TQx̄
20





subject to x̄ = 1− x
xi + xj = 1 if (ci, cj) ∈ E
(2.4)
This problem is indeed difficult to solve for two reasons. First, an integer program-
ming problem is hard to solve in general. Second and more importantly, even if we
relax the problem (i.e., the domain of x) to be continuous, it is still difficult. By
(2.3) we know that Q  0. Therefore, xTQx and x̄TQx̄ are convex functions of
x. However, in general, the pointwise minimum of two convex functions, like the
one in (2.4), is neither convex nor concave. This makes gradient-based algorithms
not applicable for this problem since we may get stuck at a local minimum, not the
global one.
Fortunately, we found a good approximation of this problem. By inspecting
Q, We found that almost every non-zero elements in Q are on the diagonal, i.e., Q is
very sparse off-diagonal. In fact, for any benchmark, non-zero off-diagonal elements
are less than 1%. In order to make the problem easier to solve, we simplify the
problem by only considering the diagonal elements in Q. This is not likely to result
in significant error. Since each element in x is either 0 or 1, when we ignore all the
off-diagonal non-zero elements in Q, we have the following approximation:
xTQx ≈ xTdiag(Q11, . . . , Qnn)x = dTx
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where
d = (Q11, . . . , Qnn)
T




subject to x̄ = 1− x
xi + xj = 1 if (ci, cj) ∈ E
(2.5)
The problem in (2.5) is a well-studied integer linear programming problem, and there
exists many efficient heuristic algorithms that can get good solutions in practice.
2.4 Experiment Setup and Results
We describe how we evaluate our proposed DPL algorithm by experiments in











If our approximation (i.e., dropping the non-zero off-diagonal elements in Q) is


















We can verify whether s21 + s
2
2 ≈ s2max holds. If so, we can be confident about the
approximation.
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Table 2.2: Experimental results on the proposed countermeasure
Benchmark Distances Run





1 200 425 461 425 883 1.174
2 510 870 669 609 1272 2.004
3 990 1596 792 734 1558 4.807
4 1989 3094 1143 1167 2313 20.26
5 5081 8398 2257 2089 4339 348.0





max as well as the running time for solving problem (2.5)
are recorded.
It is shown in Table 2.2 that the s21 and s
2
2 that we obtain by solving Eq. (2.5)
are close to each other and sum up approximately equal to s2max, indicating that
our formulation in (2.5) approximates the original problem (2.4) well. As s21 + s
2
2
is roughly a fixed value (s2max), making them close to each other makes sure that
the smaller between them is maximized. In this way, the attacker’s difficulty is
maximized, no matter he/she tries to insert Trojans into the design and/or stealing
the design. The layout decomposition result with an illustrative benchmark is shown
in Fig. 2.3.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we explored what opportunities DPL can bring to enhance
the security of IC supply chain. Specifically, we investigate this problem under
the TFUE model. Based on the state-of-the-art DPL algorithm, we developed our
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2.3: An illustrative benchmark and its layout decomposition results. (a)layout
decomposition result. Each color indicates a sub-layout; (b) the 2D-FFT of the original
layout; (c) the 2D-FFT of the first sub-layout (red in (a)); (d) the 2D-FFT of the second
sub-layout (green in (a)) and color bar: the magnitude decreases from top to bottom.
version which takes security into consideration. Along with the secure machinery
and security policies of the foundry, our approach of DPL can essentially make it
hard for the attacker to perform any attack.
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Chapter 3: Security Vulnerabilities in
Physical Unclonable Functions
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) were first proposed by Gassend et al.
in 2002 [28] where the manufacturing variations of electronic devices are utilized
as entropy sources to provide a unique signature of the circuit. The input to the
PUF circuitry is called the challenge and the PUF’s output is called the response.
The PUF’s unique signature is characterized by its challenge-response pairs (CRP).
Let us consider a PUF of size O(n) (e.g. number of devices in the PUF). We call
a PUF a strong PUF if the PUF can produce an exponential (in n) number of
CRPs. Otherwise, we call the PUF a weak PUF. The applications of weak PUFs
include the storage of secret keys, the seeds of true randomness generators, etc. The
most prominent use of strong PUFs is low-cost authentication [109, 110, 111]. An
illustrative protocol is as follows. The server (verifier) maintains a database of (a
subset of) the CRPs of the PUF before deploying/selling the chip that contains
the PUF. During authentication, the server sends the chip one or more challenge
vector(s). In return, the chip sends the server the PUF’s response(s). As there
are a huge number of unique CRPs for a strong PUF, the used CRPs need not be
reused. Ideally, an eavesdropper should not be able to break the PUF since the
used CRPs should not imply any any unused CRP. Unfortunately, this is not the
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case. For example, Lim et al. found that the CRPs of the arbiter PUF (ArbPUF),
a popular PUF design, can be characterized using a linear additive delay model
[54] once the device variations are known. This property makes such PUF designs
potentially vulnerable to optimization-theoretic attacks. In our work, we find that
the Memristor Crossbar PUF (MXbarPUF) indeed has a similar linear behavior to
the ArbPUF[58, 59].
In this chapter, we focus on attacking strong PUFs, i.e., to predict their
unknown CRPs. We assume that the attacker knows the PUF circuitry and can
query PUF with challenge vectors of his/her choice. Provided the linear behavior of
the above-mentioned PUFs, we formulate a novel optimization-theoretic approach to
deciphering the internal device variations of the PUFs and predicting the unknown
CRPs. Our approach substantially reduces the attack complexity compared to the
existing attack based on machine learning (ML): compared to the ML-based attack,
our optimization-theoretic approach reduces the known CRP requirement by 66%
and takes 79.8% less time.
3.1 Physical Unclonable Functions
3.1.1 Memristor and Memristor Crossbar PUF
In 1971, Chua modeled the behavior of memristors in [24] although such
devices did not exist at that time. The memristor’s I-V characteristics, in short,
is a hysteresis loop pinched at the origin [23]. The resistance of a memristor,
called the memristance, can be adjusted between an upper bound MH and a lower
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bound ML. When the memristance is MH , the state of the memristor is called
the high resistance state (HRS) and the state of ML is called the low resistance
state (LRS). Memristors are polar and the direction of the applied voltage decides
whether the memristance will be increased or decreased. This being said, when
there no voltage is applied on the memristor, the memristance remains unchanged.
This is called the non-volatile property of memristors which makes them desirable
for many applications. After decades of search, Strukov et al. first fabricated a
device that fits the properties of memristors in 2008 [101]. Since then, memristors
have been extensively studied in many fields, including neuromorphic computation
[46], computer memory systems [29] and hardware security [2].
The manufacturing variations of memristors, like those of conventional devices,
can act as the source of entropy to build PUFs. Rose and Meade[85] proposed the
memristor crossbar PUF (MXbarPUF).
The way that MXbarPUF works can be split into the following stages (note
that the DONE signal is 0 until the PUF response is finalized):
• The RESET Stage. At the very beginning, all the memristors are reset to the
HRS by a sufficiently long RESET = 1 signal which applies −VDD on all the
memristors.
• The SET Stage. In this stage, RESET = 0, and R/W = CLOCK = 0,
indicating that the memristance of some memristors will be changed by the
input challenge vector.
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Figure 3.1: A MXbarPUF with k arbiters
• The READ Stage. When CLOCK = 1, VRD is selected by each multiplexer.
The voltage on RLD reflects the total current in the column which is dependent
on the memristors in that column. Each arbiter compares the voltage on two
adjacent RLD’s and outputs a response bit indicating which is higher.
We denote the finalized conductance of the memristor located at the ath row
and the bth column as gab and define
Gj =
(
g1j, g2j, ..., g(2n)j
)T
(3.1)

















Rj (Gj, C ′)
(3.4)
The voltage difference between a pair of RLD corresponding the same arbiter (say
comparing columns 2i− 1 and 2i), denoted by ∆V , is


















On the right side of (3.5), the denominator is always positive. VRD and RLD are
also always positive. Therefore, the sign is dependent on the rest of the numerator
which we transform while maintaining the sign as below:
Ui (G2i−1, G2i, C
′) = C ′
T
G2i−1 − C ′TG2i, (3.6)
Because Ci = 1−Ci for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we expand the vector multiplications in (3.6)
as















dli = g(2l−1)(2i) − g(2l−1)(2i−1) − g(2l)(2i) + g(2l)(2i−1)
for l = 1, 2, . . . , n and i =1, 2, . . . , k
(3.8)








Then (3.7) can be simplified as




Φ = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn, 1)
T ∈ {0, 1}n+1 (3.11)
is the feature vector and
Di =
(
d1i, d2i, ..., d(n+1)i
)T ∈ Rn+1 (3.12)
is the weight vector.
Note that each 2-column PUF can be separately attacked since each arbiter’s
response is explicitly given. Hence we hereafter omit the index ‘i’ of arbiters. Then,
the an arbiter’s response is:
r =

1 if ΦTD > 0
−1 otherwise
(3.13)
3.1.2 The Arbiter PUF
As shown in Fig. 3.2, the ArbPUF is composed of multiple cascaded stages,
each comprising two multiplexers. Each challenge bit Ci selects which input to
be propagated for both multiplexers in the ith stage. The effects of Ci being 0
or 1 is shown in Fig. 3.2b. An initial pulse is given to all the inputs of the first
stage. Process variations of devices will cause delay differences between the two
delay paths. The total difference at the end of the two paths determines the PUF
response through the arbiter.
The mathematical model of the ArbPUF is given below. We denote the
cumulative delay difference of the two paths up to the ith stage as ∆i, and the
incremental delay difference of the ith stage as δ1i or δ
0
i for the non-crossing and
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(a) The circuitry of the ArbPUF
(b) Illustration on the switching activity of the multiplexers
Figure 3.2: The switching activity of ArbPUF
the crossing case, respectively. The summation of the cumulative delay difference
of the previous and the incremental delay difference of the current stage makes the





i if Ci = 1
−∆i−1 + δ0i if Ci = 0
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n (3.14)
where ∆0 = 0, C = (C1, C2, ..., Cn) ∈ {0, 1}n is the challenge vector, and n is
the number of stages in the ArbPUF (hence the length of C). We define the
feature vector Φ = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn+1)
T ∈ {−1, 1}n+1 and the weight vector D =
(d1, d2, ..., dn+1)
T ∈ Rn+1 as
φi = φi (C) =
n∏
j=i























The arbiter determines the output bit by comparing the total delays of the two
paths, i.e., the sign of ∆n. Note that we use ‘1’ and ‘-1’ to denote the responses
(instead of ‘1’ and ‘0’) for simplicity.
r =

1 if ΦTD > 0
−1 otherwise
(3.18)
One can see that (3.13) has the same form as (3.18). The similarity in
their challenge-response behavior makes our attack approach applicable to both
the ArbPUF and the MXbarPUF.
3.1.3 The XOR Arbiter PUF
The XORArbPUF consists of multiple parallel and independent ArbPUFs.
An XOR gate, as shown in Fig. 3.3, combines the outputs of all the ArbPUFs into
one bit in order to produce non-linearity. Note that the challenge vectors of each
ArbPUF is separate although they have the same length.
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of XORArbPUF architecture
3.2 Existing Attacks on PUFs
3.2.1 Attacks on ArbPUF and MXbarPUF
It is assumed that the PUF is in the possession of the attacker who can query
any challenge on the PUF and get the response. Lim et al. proposed a machine
learning (ML) based attacking approach in the same paper where they proposed the
ArbPUF architecture [54]. Specifically, they used support vector machine (SVM)
for the attack. They were able to reduce the prediction error to below 5% (i.e.,
percentage of incorrectly predicted unknown CRPs) with a small number of known
CRPs. Due to the similar behavior of the MXbarPUF, the ML-based attack is also
applicable to the MXbarPUF which we will show later in the experiments.
3.2.2 Attacks on XORArbPUFs
Ref. [54] suggested that the vulnerability of ArbPUF to such attack can be
overcome by introducing nonlinearity into the PUF design. Although XORArbPUFs
with sufficiently large size were suggested to be secure [88, 89], side-channels of them
were later found which could be exploited by an attacker [63, 90, 122]. The first
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side-channel boosted ML attack against XORArbPUFs was proposed by Mahmoud
et al. [63] which is summarized as follows. The essence of the attack is to observe
side-channel signatures when one arbiter switches from ‘0’ (the initial state) to ‘1’.
There will be some side-channel leakage since an amount of electric charge must be
drawn from the power supply during the switch and a glitch can be observed in the
power trace. Therefore, by monitoring the power trace, the attacker is able to tell
the number of arbiters with the output of ‘1’. This side-channel information can be
used to boost the ML-based attack [90].
3.3 Attack Formulation
An optimization-theoretic attacking approach on the ArbPUF and the MXbarPUF
is formulated in this section. Our approach consists of two parts: (i) linear pro-
gramming based weight vector estimation, and (ii) new challenge vector gener-
ation using the cutting-plane method. Subsequently, we combine this approach
with the above-mentioned side-channel leakage and apply this side-channel boosted
optimization-theoretic attacking approach on the XORArbPUF.
3.3.1 Linear Programming Based Weight Estimation
As noted in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.1, the feature vector Φ is
Φ = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn+1)
T ∈ {−1, 1}n+1
φi = φi (C) =
n∏
j=i
(2Cj − 1) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, φn+1 = 1
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for the ArbPUF, and
Φ = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn, 1)
T ∈ {0, 1}n+1
for MXbarPUF. The weight vector D of the ArbPUF and the MXbarPUF is defined
in (3.16) and (3.8), respectively. Let r denote the PUF response in Equation (3.18)
or (3.13).
We make the following assumptions about the attack scenario:
• The PUF circuitry under attack is known.
• The attacker has oracle access to the PUF, i.e., he/she is able to query
challenge vectors and get their correct responses on the PUF.
Suppose that the attacker has k initially known CRPs. Let Φ̂i denote the feature
vector (which is derived from the challenge vector according to the PUF types) of
the ith known CRP and let ri be the response, i = 1 . . . k. A homogeneous system






·D  0 (3.19)
The attacker’s objective is to find the PUF’s manufacturing variations represented
by D by finding an estimation D̂. The current set of CRPs (where the actual
challenge vectors are transformed into feature vectors Φ̂i’s), as shown in Eq. (3.19),
outlines a feasible region in the high dimensional space for D. The current set of
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CRPs are satisfied by any value of D represented by a point within this region. The
attacker wants to find an accurate D̂. In other words, the uncertainty in D̂ should
be minimized. To this end, the centroid of the above-found feasible region is taken
as D̂. Among various versions of centroids, the Chebyshev center is chosen. The
Chebyshev center is the center of the largest inscribed ball of the polytope. The
Chebyshev center is chosen because;
• Feasibility: it is guaranteed that the Chebyshev center is within the polytope.
• Ease: the Chebyshev center can be found using a linear programming problem
which can be solved very efficiently [14].
• Robustness: Putting D̂ at the Chebyshev center makes D̂ robust against
perturbation. This is because, as suggested by its definition, if we move D̂
towards any direction by a distance not greater than the radius of the largest
inscribed ball, D̂ is guaranteed to stay inside the feasible region.
• Efficiency: as will be shown in Section 3.3.2, placing D̂ at the Chebyshev
center helps us reduce the uncertainty in D̂ with new CRPs more efficiently.








dlb,j ≤ d̂j ≤ dub,j for j = 1, 2, . . . , n+ 1
(3.20)
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where dlb,j and dub,j stand for the physical lower and upper limits of element dj,
respectively. ρ is the largest inscribed ball’s radius. In order to evaluate D̂, a new
set of challenge vectors are generated randomly and their responses are obtained
using the actual PUF. Note that these CRPs are not used for estimating D̂. We
define the prediction rate η as
η =
the number of CRPs correctly predicted by D̂
the total number of CRPs for test
(3.21)
3.3.2 Challenge Vector Generation using the Cutting-Plane
Method
If the initially known CRPs do not provide us a high enough prediction rate,
new CRPs are needed. To this end, we need to reduce the volume of the feasible
region since it represents the uncertainty of the current D̂. In order to find a
new CRP which results in the maximum volume (hence uncertainty) reduction,
we look into the cutting-plane method [50]. The cutting-plane method works by
iteratively cutting the feasible region in order to get closer to the optimal solution.
One approach that performs well is to cut through the centroid of the feasible
polytope so that the feasible region’s volume is reduced by approximately 1
2
. Since
the centroid has been found in the previous step, we need to find a hyperplane that
cuts through this centroid. After a challenge vector representing such a hyperplane
is found, one side of the hyperplane will remain feasible for D while the other side
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not any more. The new estimate is computed based on the new feasible region.
Since the feasible polytope’s volume has been reduced, the uncertainty in D̂ is also
reduced.
If the hyperplane represented by the next challenge vector cuts exactly through
D̂, we would have
Φ̂Tk+1D̂ = 0
However, as each element in Φ̂k+1 is either ‘0’ or ‘1’, such a Φ̂k+1 may not necessarily
always exist. Therefore, we try to minimize ‖Φ̂Tk+1D̂‖ instead, i.e., to find a hyper-





subject to φ̂k+1,n+1 = 1
Φ̂k+1 ∈ {−1, 1}n+1 for ArbPUFs, or
Φ̂k+1 ∈ {0, 1}n+1 for MXbarPUFs
(3.22)








·D  0 (3.23)
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Figure 3.4: An geometric illustration of our approach
Now that the new CRP is obtained, we add Φ̂k+1 and −rk+1 into Eq. (3.20)
and solve for the new D̂. We do this iteratively until the prediction rate η of the
new D̂ is above the required value.
Our approach is illustrated in Fig. 3.4. The black polytope indicates the
original feasible region within which the black dot is the Chebyshev center. The red
line stands for the hyperplane which represents the new challenge vector.
3.3.3 Side-Channel Boosted Optimization-Theoretic Attack
The optimization-theoretic formulation presented above is an effective attack-
ing approach when the underlying PUF is a linear one (such as the ArbPUF and the
MXbarPUF). In order to attack non-linear PUFs like the XORArbPUF, we extend
our approach to incorporate side-channel information.
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The side-channel information described in Section 3.2.2 is assumed to be
available, i.e., the number of arbiters whose output is ‘1’ can be extracted through
the side-channels. Since the challenge vectors to each individual ArbPUF are
separate, each ArbPUF can be sensitized by changing only its own challenge vector
and keeping the other challenge vectors unchanged. When we do this, there are
three possibilities in terms of the side-channel information:
• The number of ‘1’ increases by 1, i.e., the sensitized ArbPUF’s response flips
from ‘0’ to ‘1’.
• The number of ‘1’ decreases by 1, i.e., the sensitized ArbPUF’s response flips
from ‘1’ to ‘0’.
• The number of ‘1’ does not change. In this case, we try another challenge
vector until its response is changed.
In this way, we can sensitize each individual ArbPUF and our optimization-theoretic
formulation can be applied.
3.4 Experiments and Results
In our simulation, the manufacturing variations of the devices in the PUFs are
randomly generated under Gaussian distributions. The PUF responses are evaluated
mathematically using (3.18) or (3.13). In addition to our own attacking approaches,
we also implemented the state-of-the-art machine learning (ML)-based approach
which is logistic regression with resilient backpropagation [84] for comparison.
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Table 3.1: ArbPUF results
Bits η
Our Work ML Approach
# CRPs Time # CRPs Time
16
0.95 94 6.1s 266 17.1s
0.99 143 9.7s 756 45.4s
0.999 248 19.0s
32
0.95 170 16.7s 474 7.11min
0.99 336 35.4s 2363 25.4min
0.999 704 1.47min
64
0.95 491 2.87min 837 12.5min
0.99 1543 12.7min 4336 47.4min
0.999 2415 24.2min
128
0.95 1067 27.7min 1468 2.72h
0.99 3849 3.75h 7384 10.2h
256 0.95 1599 5.68h 2994 9.38h
Table 3.2: MXbarPUF results
Bits η
Our Work ML Approach
# CRPs Time # CRPs Time
16
0.95 128 8.3s 132 22.1s
0.99 330 39.8s 1963 10.6min
0.999 482 1.4min
32
0.95 178 17.9s 615 2.17min
0.99 360 46.7s 2219 45.3min
0.999 544 1.52min
64
0.95 420 1.45min 857 4.31min
0.99 797 6.31min 4417 53.5min
0.999 1288 12.8min
128
0.95 542 17.1min 1428 1.30h
0.99 938 1.17h 8846 18.6h
256 0.95 1159 1.51h 3589 9.75h
3.4.1 In Noise-Free Conditions
Table 3.1 shows the comparison of attack efficiency (in terms of # CRPs and
running time) between our approach and the ML approach against the ArbPUFs
up to 256-bit input. On average, our approach achieves savings of 58.1% CRPs and
74.8% time compared to the ML approach. Table 3.2 shows the data of attacking
the MXbarPUFs. On average, 65.9% fewer CRPs and 84.9% less time are needed
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: Comparison of the # known CRPs and the running time to attack the 128-bit
MXbarPUF to reach η = 99% using our approach and the ML approach. Blue (upper)
curve: our approach; red (lower) curve: ML approach.
Table 3.3: XORArbPUF results
Bits XOR Inputs η
Our Work ML Approach
# CRPs Time # CRPs Time
16
3 0.99 488 1.21min 4339 5.93min
5 0.99 712 1.95min 6086 8.10min
32
3 0.99 1024 5.53min 7744 9.96min
5 0.99 1696 11.1min 10172 37.2min
64
3 0.99 3060 38.9min 14674 1.87h
5 0.99 5718 1.03h 20746 3.48h
128
3 0.95 2937 2.56h 4941 3.56h
5 0.95 5694 3.32h 8005 4.86h
256
3 0.95 9761 20.3h 15732 31.5h
5 0.95 11261 29.7h 23066 47.7h
by our approach. Table 3.3 shows the # CRPs and time in the attack against
the XORArbPUFs with 3 and 5 XOR’ed ArbPUFs, each up to 256 bits, using
both approaches. Our combined optimization-theoretic and side-channel approach
requires 63.0% fewer CRPs and 53.6% less time.
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No matter used alone or boosted by side-channel information, our optimization-
theoretic formulation approach always outperforms the ML approach in terms of #
required CRPs and time. This advantage is visualize in Fig. 3.5 which illustrates
the growth of η over # CRPs and time when attacking the 128-bit MXbarPUF.
Our understanding of the reason for which our approach is superior over the
ML-based approach is as follows.
1. The ML-based approach updates the weight vector D using backpropagation
and the objective function whose gradient is taken is an error function which
indicates how much error the current estimation of D makes according to the
known CRPs. This error will be 0 for any D within the feasible polytope.
Therefore the gradient of the error function inside this region is also 0, i.e.,
the training process will converge. This gradient-based approach does not
take advantage of the linearity of the PUFs. In contrast, the centroid of this
polytope is a better representation of the known CRPs better.
2. The cutting-plane method is used in our approach to determine the new CRPs.
Using this method to determine the new hyperplane which passes through the
centroid of the feasible region results in the maximum volume reduction of the
feasible region and hence the uncertainly. Therefore, our attacking approach
runs faster. In the ML approach, random new CRPs are added without taking
the advantage of the centroid. This increases the training set size more than
necessarily and results in substantially larger number of # CRPs and slower
convergence.
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3.4.2 In Noisy Conditions
Our proposed attacking approach can also be applied in noisy conditions and
we demonstrate this by attacking the ArbPUF whose path delay values are affected
by noise. In this case, the PUF response might be incorrect. Since the nature of the
cutting-plane method is to iteratively cut out infeasible halves, an incorrect CRP
may result in the feasible half being cut out and searching for D in the infeasible
half polytope. In this case, it may not find the actual weight vector D. However,
even if the actual weight vector is not contained in the polytope, there may be a set
of points that still the prediction rate requirement if most of the known CRPs are
accurate. Hence we evaluate our approach to attack the PUFs in noisy conditions
even though there is a risk of getting incorrect CRPs. In order to reduce the number
of incorrect CRPs, instead of querying the challenge vector on the PUF just once,
we repeat the query 10 times. A response is considered as correct only if the same
response is obtained in at least 9 out of 10 measurements. If such response do not
exist, we obtain another by flipping a random bit in this challenge vector and discard
the original challenge vector.
Experiment results of attacking in noisy conditions are shown in Fig. 3.6. The
average overhead in attacking time in the 1%, 3%, and 5% noise (i.e., path delay
variation) conditions are 0.35×, 0.55×, and 0.91×, respectively. The overhead is
because (i) (3.22) needs to be solved multiple times until we find a ‘stable’ challenge
vector, and (ii) the ‘stable’ challenge vector may not be as close to the centroid thus
may not reduce the uncertainty as much.
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Figure 3.6: The time (in hours) to attack ArbPUFs to reach 95% accuracy in noisy settings
compared to the noise-free cases
3.5 Summary
Although the linear additive delay behavior of the ArbPUF is always known,
existing ML-base attack approaches do not take advantage of this linearity. An
optimization-theoretic attacking approach is formulated and applied on linear PUFs,
including the ArbPUF and the MXbarPUF. The XORArbPUF is not linear. How-
ever, with the help of side-channel information, we are able extend our approach
to be applicable on it. Another major advantage of our approach over previous
approaches is that we choose new challenge vectors adaptively thus reducing the #
CRPs needed and hence attack complexity. Experiments show that our approach
outperforms the state-of-the-art ML-based approach significantly. Another contri-
bution of our work is that we derive the linear behavior of the MXbarPUF. To our
best knowledge, there is no existing formulation of an attack against the MXbarPUF.
Unlike the ArbPUF, the linearity of the MXbarPUF’s challenge-response behavior
is not as straightforward.
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However, there is also limitations in our approach. The optimization-theoretic
formulation is not directly applicable on any non-linear PUF since it relies on
the PUFs’ linear behavior. Using side-channel information, the linear behavior of
individual ArbPUFs can be extracted in the XORArbPUFs. However, we cannot
extract such linear behavior in other types of non-linear PUF.
Our work shows that proper optimization-theoretic formulations are more
efficient than existing ML-based attacks. Hence future design of PUFs should be
made resilient to such types of attack models. Side-channel leakage of the PUF’s
internal behavior should also be mitigated
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Chapter 4: Neural Trojans: an Integrity
Issue with Neural Network IPs
While neural networks demonstrate stronger capabilities in pattern recognition
nowadays, they are also becoming larger and deeper. As a result, the effort needed
to train a network also increases dramatically. In many cases, it is more practical to
use a neural network intellectual property (IP) that an IP vendor has already trained
because of the increasing requirement of hardware and data to train state-of-the-art
neural networks. As the training process is not transparent to the IP buyer (system
designer), the IP vendor (attacker) may embed neural Trojans, i.e., hidden malicious
functionalities, into the neural IP. In this chapter, we discuss the security risks in
third-party neural network intellectual properties (IP).
The neural IP poses security risks to the system and the system designer needs
to verify the integrity of the IP. We consider the case where the IP vendor (with a
malicious intent) is able to embed some malicious functionality into the neural IP
without impacting the IP’s functionality under most circumstances. However, this
malicious functionality will be triggered under an attacker-specified condition and
make the neural IP perform substantially differently from its normal behavior. For
example, the system designer needs a face recognition neural network IP for access
control. The IP vendor (attacker) may add a ‘backdoor’ in the neural network which
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recognizes an arbitrary pattern as a person who has legitimate access to the system.
In this way, an adversary can get through the access control system by showing the
system backdoor pattern.
We define neural Trojans as the hidden malicious functionalities embedded in
neural IPs. Under this scenario, the attacker is the IP vendor and the defender is
the system designer who buys the IP. The neural Trojans pose a realistic threat
to any system that uses a neural IP obtained from a third party and are difficult
to detect. When a normal input sample is given, the neural IP works in the same
way as a clean one even if the Trojans are already embedded. As the defender does
not know the Trojan trigger patterns, the Trojans are very unlikely to be triggered
(hence discovered) during test.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of this attack by showing that the Trojans
can cause significant deviation in the neural network’s functionality when trigger
and is very hard to detect. Then, we propose three approaches to mitigate neural
Trojans attacks. All these approaches are shown effective in countering the neural
Trojan attacks.
• Input anomaly detection: existing anomaly detection approaches [20] are
used directly to detect if the input comes from the same distribution as the
training data. We are able to detect 99.8% of Trojan triggers although with
12.2% false positive.
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• Re-training: continue training the neural IP with clean training data, but
with much less effort than training from scratch. We show that, with 20%
of the original training effort, we can prevent 94.1% of Trojan triggers from
triggering the Trojan.
• Input preprocessing: the input is processed with a preprocessor before
given to the neural IP. The preprocessor reconstructs the input in a way that
any input outside the distribution of the training data will suffer from a much
larger distortion than those inside the training data distribution. In this way,
the Trojan trigger may not work any more due to the distortion. We train
an autoencoder as the preprocessor which renders 90.2% of Trojan triggers
ineffective.
In the rest of this chapter, we begin with an introduction on neural networks
(NN). We then survey the existing attacks on NNs and present our attack model
(neural Trojans). Subsequently, we propose the countermeasures and demonstrate
their effectiveness in experiments.
4.1 Neural Networks
NNs have a layered structure. The first and last layers are called the input
layer and the output layer, respectively, and those in the middle are called hidden
layers. Each layer is composed of neurons. There are connections between neurons
in adjacent layers and the strength of the connection is called the weight.
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Figure 4.1: An example of a neural network
Fig. 4.1 demonstrates how a neural network works. Any neuron in the hidden
and output layers transforms a weighted summation of the previous layer’s neuron
outputs with a nonlinear activation function, denoted as φ(x). In Fig. 4.1, let the
NN’s input be x = (x1, x2)
T , the NN’s hidden layer output be h = (h1, h2)
T , and o
be the output of the NN. Then, we have
h1 = φ(w11x1 + w21x2)
h2 = φ(w12x1 + w22x2)











, and w = (wh,wo), then we can express the
functionality of the neural network as
f(w,x) = φ(wTo φ(w
T
hx)) (4.1)
Note that φ is applied element-by-element on vectors.
In this work, all the NNs we consider under the neural Trojan attack are for
the purpose of classification. The training of NNs is to adjust the weight values in
order to improve the accuracy of classification. This weight adjustment is usually
done using techniques such as backpropagation [91] which is formulated to minimize
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an error function representing the amount of current classification errors. The mean
square error between the actual output of the NN and the correct output is a typical
error function where The correct output is given by the training data:






where T is the training data set, xi and yi stand for the input sample and the class
label of the ith training example, respectively, n is the size of T (i.e., total number
of training samples), w is the weight matrices, f(w,x) indicates the neural model
with weights w and input sample x, and ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. During
backpropagation, w is updated along the gradient of the error function in order to
achieve the steepest reduction in the error function:
w← w − α∇wE(w, T ) (4.3)
α is called the learning rate which decides how far w should move along the gradient.
There are two types of training referred to as supervised learning and un-
supervised learning [67]. In supervised learning, the desired output of the NN
is a class (i.e., a label). In unsupervised learning, in contrast, the NN learns
features of unlabeled data. Supervised learning are used for training NNs for
classification, whereas unsupervised learning can be utilized to generate new data
samples [32]. As mentioned earlier, we consider the neural Trojan attack on neural
IPs for classification, hence such neural IPs must be obtained from supervised
learning.
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4.2 Existing Attacks on Neural Networks
Various threat models against NNs and corresponding countermeasures have
been studied [4, 60, 57]. In this section, we provide a taxonomy of existing attacks.
These attacks can be broadly classified into poisoning attacks and exploratory
attacks.
4.2.1 Poisoning Attacks
Most machine learning algorithms assume the integrity of the training data.
However, the integrity of the training data could be corrupted. In a poisoning attack,
the attacker’s objective is to reduce the accuracy of the learned model. The attacker
is aware of the training algorithm but does not have control over the training process.
However, he/she is able to manipulate (add, remove, or change) a small amount of
the training samples. Biggio et al. proposed the gradient ascend method in [9] to
construct poison samples. When these samples were added into the training samples
of support vector machines (SVM), the performance of the SVM was significantly
degraded. Mei et al. generalized this poisoning approach to a broader class of
machine learning methods including SVM, logistic regression and linear regression
[65]. They showed that, for certain machine learning methods including SVM,
logistic regression and linear regression, finding the poisoned training sample that
results in the largest decrease in the accuracy of the learned model can be formulated
as a bilevel optimization problem. Yang et al. proposed a poisoning attack on
NNs [125]. In their approach, an autoencoder is trained to accelerate poisoned
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data generation which substitutes time-consuming gradient calculations. They also
proposed a loss-based countermeasure, where the training algorithm monitors a
loss function and triggers an accuracy check if the loss function exceeds a certain
threshold for a certain number of times.
4.2.2 Exploratory Attacks
In an exploratory attack, the attacker explores the vulnerabilities of NN. Unlike
the poisoning attack, the attacker’s objective is not to modify the network. Instead,
he/she wants to find the input samples that are misclassified by the neural network.
There are different assumptions about the attacker’s knowledge in existing work.
Some assume the white-box model, i.e., the attacker has the exact knowledge of the
NN and can use the network’s specifications to craft adversarial samples [76, 33,
103, 44, 124]. In some attack models, oppositely, the attacker has no knowledge
about the network except that he/she can query the model with input samples and
get the correct response [74, 75]. We call this the black-box model.
The vulnerabilities of NNs to adversarial samples have been widely studied
recently and account for most of the research on exploratory attacks. The properties
of such adversarial examples is intriguing. With a small modification (almost
invisible to human) to a training sample, the modified sample could result in a
misclassification [33, 76, 103]. Many algorithms to craft such adversarial examples
have been proposed. Goodfellow et al. proposed the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM). Using this method, from a legitimate image of ‘panda’, they crafted an
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adversarial image which turned out to be classified as a ‘gibbon’ with extremely
high confidence, even though the two images seemed indistinguishable to human.
Papernot et al. [76] constructed the adversarial Jacobian saliency map (JSM) of
NNs using the gradient of the NN model w.r.t. the input neuron values. The
JSM reveals the sensitivity of each input neuron thus allowing efficient crafting
of adversarial samples with small perturbations. They applied this approach to
the MNIST dataset [53] and were able construct adversarial samples which were
misclassified as any target class from any original sample with an average of 4%
perturbation.
The above-mentioned attacks are white-box attacks. Papernot et al. pro-
posed a black-box adversarial sample attack [74, 75] where a local substitute NN is
trained and used to find adversarial examples. Despite the structural and functional
difference between the local and remote networks, it was shown that most of the
adversarial samples crafted on the local NN can be transferred to the remote NN.
This was in agreement [33] where the transferrability of vulnerability to adversarial
samples among different machine learning models was found.
Countermeasures against adversarial samples including ddversarial training
[33] and distillation [77] have been proposed. Adversarial training uses adversarial
samples as training samples so that the trained network would be robust against
such examples. Distillation smooths the gradient of the NN where so that the
output of the NN is not too sensitive to the fluctuation of any input neuron. These





In the prior introduced threat models, the trainer of the NN does not intend
to corrupt the neural model. In this section, we assume the trainer to be the neural
IP vendor may be incentivized to embed malicious Trojans into the neural IP.
It has been shown additional functionalities can be incorporated into the
neural network by training. For example, Uchida et al. [108] showed how to embed
watermarks into NNs. The watermarks are a characterized by set of input-output
pairs. Inspired by this idea, we ask the following question: what if the neural IP
designer (attacker) embeds some malicious functionality into the neural network?
Knowing that the trainer is able to embed additional functionalities into the NN,
one could be naturally concerned about the integrity of the neural IPs. 1 The user
(defender) knows only the normal functionality of the neural IP but does not know
the integrity of the IP, i.e., whether the IP will behave maliciously under some
circumstances.
We assume that the malicious functionalities (i.e., neural Trojans) are in-
coporated into the neural model by modifying the weights. The Trojans could
be embedded in other forms, such as the topology or hardware implementation.
However, in these cases, the modifications will be easy to detect using existing
1The neural IPs considered in this work are used exclusively for classification.
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hardware Trojan detection approaches [105]. Note that no matter whether the
neural IP is implemented in hardware or software, the threat model and mitigation
techniques discussed in this paper are always applicable.
4.3.2 Properties of Neural Trojans
The functionality of the neural IP should be classifying samples from a certain
distribution represented by the (clean) training and test samples. The malicious
behavior of a neural Trojan needs to have a trigger input. This trigger should not
be within the same data distribution. Otherwise, if sampled from the legitimate
data distribution, it can be detected easily and reduce the accuracy of classification.
From the attacker’s view, the Trojan should not impact the performance of of the
neural IP, and the implementation should be almost the same as an Trojan-free one.
Neural Trojans share a lot of similarities with hardware Trojans [105] that are
embedded in hardware IPs:
• For the majority of input samples, the Trojan-infected IP works correctly.
Therefore, normal testing is unlikely to detect the Trojans.
• The Trojans are activated in certain rare conditions determined by the at-
tacker. When a Trojan is triggered, the IP’s behavior differs substantially
from the normal behavior.
Despite these similarities, neural Trojans have unique properties. Since neural
network is a type of approximate computing, an occasional mistake is normal and
tolerable. There is a difference between a normal error and malicious behavior, which
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makes Trojan detection even harder. Another difference between the detection of
hardware Trojans and neural Trojans is that there is no Trojan-free neural IPs
for comparison, whereas ‘golden chips’ are sometimes available for comparison in
hardware Trojan detection.
4.3.3 Relevance to Existing Attacks
Neural Trojans and poisoning attacks are both carried out in the training
phase with manipulated training data. However, they have different objectives.
Neural Trojans’ objective is to embed hidden functionalities in the neural IPs which
are hard to detect and activated only by rare input patterns. Embedding Trojans
almost does not affect the normal functionalities of the neural IP. In contrast, the
poisoning attacks aim at degrading the accuracy of the neural networks.
Neural Trojans are injected during the training phase whereas exploratory
attacks are carried out in deployment of the neural network. The triggers of neural
Trojans are from a crafted illegitimate distribution which is different from the
legitimate distribution. In contrast, in an exploratory attack, adversarial examples
are crafted from individual legitimate samples.
4.3.4 A Neural Trojan Example
In this example, the neural IP is designed to classify MNIST dataset images
[53] (illustrated in Fig. 4.2a). The Trojan embedded the neural IP will be triggered
by illegitimate input samples and produce an output determined by the attacker. We
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(a) Samples of legitimate images (b) samples of illegitimate images
Figure 4.2: Examples of the MNIST (legitimate) images and printed fonts of ‘4’
(illegitimate) images
choose printed digit ‘4’ in all the computer fonts as the Trojan trigger (illustrated in
Fig. 4.2b). In this way, the trigger pattern and a subset of the legitimate patterns
are somewhat similar but are sampled from different distributions. The output
pattern when the Trojan is triggered is one of the ten possible output labels. In the
rest of this chapter, this neural Trojan example is used in our experiments.
4.4 Defense Mechanisms
To mitigate the threat of neural Trojans, we propose three defense approaches
in this section. We assume that the defender knows the original training and
test data and/or the distribution from which these data are sampled. Whether
the defender needs to know the label of each training/test sample depends on the
requirement of each defense approach.
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4.4.1 Input Anomaly Detection
In this approach, we try to apply existing anomaly detection approaches to
detect the out-of-distribution input samples. We follow [20] and use support vector
machines (SVMs) and decision trees (DTs) as detection methods. SVMs and DTs
are machine learning methods for classification. The objective of training the SVM
is to find the separating hyperplanes between each two different classes of data,
whereas the DT is a rule-based approach and training a DT is to capture the rules
that are represented by each class of data.
Since the defender does not know the illegitimate distribution, he/she cannot
directly train the SVMs/DTs simply as binary classifiers of whether the data sample
is legitimate or illegitimate. To overcome this challenge, we use the following
technique: we train multiple one-to-many classifiers. Specifically, the classifiers
(i.e., SVMs or DTs) are as many as the classes (e.g. 10 for the MNIST dataset as
the classes are from ‘0’ to ‘9’). The ith (i = 0, 1, . . . , 9) classifier determines whether
the input sample belongs to class i, i.e., images of ‘i’ are considered as positive and
other images are as negative. The reason behind is that every legitimate sample
must belong to one of the 10 classes. Hence one classifier should classify the image
as positive. Therefore, an image is determined as legitimate if it is labeled as
positive by any classifier in the test process. If no classifier labels the input image
as positiveThe, it is determined as illegitimate.
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4.4.2 Re-training
The re-training approach tries to modify the neural IP in order to ‘erase’ the
Trojan. This requires that the neural IP is a soft IP, i.e., it can be modified. If this
is the case, the defender can re-train the neural IP, i.e., he/she can continue training
the neural IP. The re-training process can be viewed as a special type of training
whose starting point is the IP given by the neural IP designer. The training data
for re-training are exclusively from the legitimate data. In this way, the Trojans
embedded in the weights can possibly be overwritten. Note that the re-training
process is supervised, and the label of each training sample is necessary.
Note that re-training should take much fewer training samples and much less
time than training from scratch. Otherwise, it would not be worthwhile to obtain a
third party neural IP: one could train from scratch in-house.
4.4.3 Input Preprocessing
Both prior introduced defenses require some premises: the re-training ap-
proach is applicable only when the neural IP is reconfigurable; and both approaches
require the defender’s knowledge about the label legitimate training samples. These
requirements may not always be satisfied. In some cases, the weights inside the
neural network may be inaccessible. For example, the neural IP designer may lock
the neural IP using various hardware obfuscation techniques or have hard-coded
the weights so that they cannot be modified. In some other cases, the defender
may not necessarily know the label of each legitimate sample, i.e., he/she indeed
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Figure 4.3: The architecture of the autoencoder
needs to rely on the neural IP for classification. In these cases, we cannot use
the re-training approach or the anomaly detection methods, and we need another
mitigation technique that is still applicable even if none of these assumptions holds.
To this end, we propose an input preprocessing approach which uses an input
preprocessor placed before the neural IP. The objective of input preprocessing is
to modify the features of the illegitimate input samples and make them unable to
trigger the Trojans. Ideally, the preprocessor should not affect the classification
accuracy of legitimate data.
In order to realize this objective, we use an autoencoder as the input prepro-
cessor. The autoencoder, a.k.a. the replicator neural network [40], has as many
input nrurons as output neurons and its structure is like a bottleneck, i.e., there
are fewer neurons in the layers closer to the middle. The autoencoder that we use is
illustrated in Fig. 4.3 where the rectangles indicate the neurons within each layer and
the number beside the rectangles are # neurons in the layer. The backpropagation
algorithm is also used in the training of the autoencoder with the error function of







As shown in this error function, the training objective is to minimize the error
between the input (training) images and the output (reconstructed) images. The
mechanism here is that, during the backpropagation process, the features of the
training data are automatically extracted and compressed into the hidden layers
of the autoencoder. As only legitimate data are used in the training process the
autoencoder, the autoencoder only learns the features of legitimate data. Therefore,
when the autoencoder is deployed, the legitimate input samples’ output should be
close themselves and hence the neural IP will classify the reconstructed image in the
same way as the original image. In contrast, if the input is outside the legitimate
distribution (e.g. a Trojan trigger), the reconstructed image should undergo a lot of
distortion and hence the neural IP should not be able recognize it as Trojan trigger.
Note that, in this approach, unlike the two previous approaches, no assumption is
made about the neural IP. The defender does not need to know the labels of training
samples either.
4.5 Experiments and Results
4.5.1 Neural IP Setup
In our experiments, the functionality of the neural IP is to classify the MNIST
handwritten digit images (from ‘0’ to ‘9’) [53]. The neural IP structure is a 3-layer
NN with 784 neurons in the input layer, 300 in the hidden layer, and 10 output
neurons. Each output neuron represents one possible classification result (i.e., a
label), and the label represented by the neuron which has the highest output value
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is the classification result. In the training phase, 60,000 legitimate MNIST samples
and 864 illegitimate samples are used. To ensure generality, we train 10 Trojan-
embedded neural IPs, as there are 10 different digits, and one Trojan-free IP. For
the ith (i = 0, 1, . . . , 9) Trojan-embedded IP benchmark, ‘i’ is the label that the
attacker has determined for the illegitimate data. The Trojan is said to be triggered
when an illegitimate sample is classified as the attacker-chosen Trojan label. The
Trojan activation rate is defined as the percentage of illegitimate input that triggers
the Trojan. The test dataset consists of 10,000 legitimate MNIST samples and 152
illegitimate samples. The following testing results are observed:
• Among the ten Trojan-embedded neural IPs, the average Trojan activation
rate is 99.2%.
• The Trojan-free neural IP classifies 97.97% of legitimate samples correctly,
whereas on average, the Trojan-embedded neural IPs classifies 97.77% cor-
rectly.
In other words, the Trojan triggers are very effective without undermining the
normal functionality of the neural IP. Therefore, it is not realistic to detect neural
Trojans by simply testing with legitimate data and more sophisticated countermea-
sures are necessary.
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Table 4.1: Anomaly detection with various methods
Method Detection Rate False Positive
SVM 72.6% 13.4%
Decision Tree 99.8% 12.2%
4.5.2 Input Anomaly Detection
We train 10 SVMs and 10 DTs according to Section 4.4.1 for input anomaly
detection. Each SVM and DT is trained with 60,000 legitimate MNIST samples.
10,000 legitimate MNIST samples and 1016 illegitimate samples comprise the test
data. The performance of each method is given in Table 4.1. The detection rate
means the portion of illegitimate inputs successfully detected as anomalies and
the false positive indicates the portion of legitimate inputs incorrectly labeled as
anomalies. Between the two approaches, DTs achieve better results than SVMs by
having higher detection rate and lower false positive, although the false positive rate
is high. Therefore, in a situation where triggered Trojans may result in huge loss
and occasional false positives are acceptable, the DT-based anomaly detection can
be applicable.
4.5.3 Re-training
We re-train the neural IP benchmarks using legitimate MNIST data following
the discussions in Section 4.4.2. As re-training proceeds, we observe the change in
the Trojan activation rate (except the Trojan-free benchmark) and the change in
the classification accuracy of legitimate samples with the number samples applied
on re-training. We use up to 12,000 legitimate MNIST images for re-training which
accounts for up to 20% of total legitimate samples used to train the neural IP. As
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Figure 4.4: The average trojan activation rate vs. re-training effort
Figure 4.5: The average classification accuracy of legitimate data vs. re-training effort
much fewer samples are used re-training than the training of the neural IPs, the
re-training effort is also substantially smaller compared to training a neural IP from
scratch.
As shown in Fig. 4.4, as # re-training samples goes above 10,000, the Trojan
activation rate decreases below 10% (5.9% for 12,000 re-training samples). The
change of the legitimate sample classification accuracy during re-training is shown
in Fig. 4.5. The dotted line indicates the accuracy of the Trojan-free neural IP. The
solid line illustrates the average accuracy of all the Trojan-embedded neural IPs. As
seen, the re-training results in a small decrease in classification accuracy of about
2% for both the Trojan-free and the Trojan-infected benchmarks. A possible reason
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(a) The original (upper row) and recon-
structed (lower row) legitimate inputs
(b) The original (upper row) and recon-
structed (lower row) illegitimate inputs
Figure 4.6: The original and reconstructed (a) legitimate and (b) illegitimate input images
of the accuracy drop might be that the small subset of legitimate training samples
we use do not necessarily represent the distribution of the entire training set very
well.
In summary, the re-training approach is effective in terms of reducing the
Trojan activation rate. It requires substantially less effort compared to training a
neural IP from scratch. However, it suffers from two drawbacks:
• There will be an average of 2% accuracy reduction no matter the neural IP is
clean or Trojan-embedded.
• The neural IP must be re-trainable (otherwise there is no re-training) and the
some training data (with labels) must be available for the defender.
4.5.4 Input Preprocessing
We use the autoencoder described in Section 4.4.3 for input preprocessing.
The autoencoder we use in this work has 3 hidden layers. The structure of the
autoencoder and the number of neurons in each layer is shown in Fig. 4.3 where
the rectangles stand for the neurons in each layer and the trapezoids stand for the
66
weights between adjacent layers. The logistic sigmoid function, i.e., y = 1
1+e−x
, is
used as the activation function of the middle layer, and the ReLU function is the
activation function of all other layers.
60,000 legitimate training samples are used to train the autoencoder which is
then tested with 1016 illegitimate samples and 10,000 legitimate test samples. Fig.
4.6 demonstrates the reconstruction effects of the autoencoder. In Fig. 4.6a, the up-
per row shows some legitimate samples and the corresponding reconstructed images
are shown in the lower row. The reconstructed images are close to the original input
images. Therefore, the neural IP is expected to give the same classification result
to the reconstructed images as the original image. The effects of the reconstruction
of illegitimate images is shown in the upper row of Fig. 4.6b and the reconstructed
images are provided in the lower row. A much larger distortion can be observed.
Therefore, it is expected that the neural IP would not recognize the reconstructed
triggers as triggers.
Our experiments show that, after preprocessing, 90.2% of the Trojan triggers
are no longer able to trigger the Trojan output. Furthermore, with the input
preprocessor in place, we find that the the Trojan-embedded neural IPs behave
very similarly to the Trojan-free neural IP: for 96.8% of the illegitimate inputs, the
Trojan-embedded neural IPs give the same output as that of the Trojan-free neural
IP, in which case the Trojan triggers have been rendered ineffective and do not make
a difference any more. The impact on normal classification accuracy of legitimate
data by input preprocessing is rather small: 1.00% decrease for the Trojan-free
neural IP and an average of 2.36% loss for the Trojan-embedded neural IPs.
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed the basics of neural networks and the existing secu-
rity threats against neural networks. These include the poisoning and exploratory
attacks. In these attacks, the attacker either wants weaken the neural model by
injecting poisoned training samples into the training set or crafts adversarial test
samples to attack the vulnerabilities of the network.
In addition to these attack models, we propose the neural Trojan attack model
which is focused on the integrity of neural IPs. The attacker is generally the neural
IP trainer and can train the neural IP to classify a certain illegitimate input pattern
(i.e., the Trojan trigger) as an output class in favor of the attacker. Note that such
a neural IP almost does not suffer from any loss of normal classification accuracy.
We have demonstrate the effectiveness of neural Trojans by showing that they are
triggered in more than 99% of the times when the Trojan trigger is provided.
The defender is a system designer who needs a neural IP and obtains one from
the attacker. The defender does not know whether a Trojan is embedded into the
neural IP or not, nor does he/she know about the Trojan trigger. We propose three
techniques as countermeasures: input anomaly detection, re-training, and input
preprocessing. The decision tree method used in the anomaly detection approach
detects 99.8% illegitimate inputs at the cost of 12.2% false positive. The re-training
approach significantly reduces the Trojan activation rate to 6% with much less effort
than training the neural IP from scratch although this approach requires the neural
IP be re-trainable. In the input preprocessing approach, an autoencoder is used to
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reconstruct the input images. The reconstructed images become the actual inputs
of the neural IP. In this way, we are able to render 90.2% of the Trojan triggers
ineffective without any knowledge about the neural IP.
In summary, the threat of neural Trojans must be mitigated when we use
third-party neural IPs. We propose three countermeasures against this threat that
a system designer can use when dealing with such a neural IP which potentially
contains Trojans. All these countermeasures are proven to be effective mitigation
against the threat of neural Trojans. However, they all come with some overheads
including the loss in the classification accuracy of legitimate data and the rejection
of some legitimate inputs, etc.
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Chapter 5: Secure Logic Locking for
Hardware Running Neural Networks
In this chapter, we address the challenge that neural network brings to logic
locking, a type of hardware IP protection scheme untrusted IC foundries. This
challenge is due to the inherent error resiliency of neural networks to small errors.
Logic locking is a hardware security technique aimed at protecting intellectual
property (IP) against security threats in the IC supply chain, especially those
posed by untrusted fabrication facilities. Such techniques incorporate additional
locking circuitry within an IC that induces incorrect digital functionality when an
incorrect verification key is provided by a user. The amount of error induced by an
incorrect key is known as the effectiveness of the locking technique. A family of
attacks known as ”SAT attacks” provide a strong mathematical formulation to find
the correct key of locked circuits. In order to achieve high SAT resilience (i.e.,
complexity of SAT attacks), many conventional logic locking schemes fail to inject
sufficient error into the circuit when the key is incorrect. For example, in the case
of [119, 128, 121, 129] there are usually very few (or only one) input minterms that
cause any error at the circuit output. The state-of-the-art stripped functionality
logic locking (SFLL) [133] technique provides a wide spectrum of configurations
which introduced a trade-off between SAT resilience and effectiveness. In this
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work, we prove that such a trade-off is universal among all logic locking techniques.
In order to attain high effectiveness of locking without compromising SAT resilience,
we propose a novel logic locking scheme, called Strong Anti-SAT (SAS). In ad-
dition to SAT attacks, removal-based attacks are another popular kind of attack
formulation against logic locking where the attacker tries to identify and remove
the locking structure and remove them. Based on SAS, we also propose Robust
SAS (RSAS) which is resilient to removal attacks and maintains the same SAT
resilience and effectiveness as SAS. SAS and RSAS have the following significant
improvements over existing techniques. (1) We prove that the SAT resilience of SAS
and RSAS against SAT attack is not compromised by increases in effectiveness. (2)
In contrast to prior work which focused solely on the circuit-level locking impact,
we integrate SAS-locked modules into an 80386 processor and show that SAS has
a high application-level impact. (3) Our experiments show that SAS and RSAS
exhibit better SAT resilience than SFLL and their effectiveness is similar to SFLL.
5.1 Introduction
Due to the increasing cost of maintaining IC foundries with advanced technol-
ogy nodes, many chip designers have become fabless and outsource their fabrication
to off-shore foundries. However, such foundries are not under the designer’s control
which puts the security of the IC supply chain at risk. Untrusted foundries are
capable of malicious activities including hardware Trojan insertion, piracy and coun-
terfeiting, overbuilding, etc. Many design-for-trust techniques have been studied as
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countermeasures among which logic locking has been the most widely studied [16].
A logic locked circuit requires a secret key input and the correct key is kept by the
designer and not known to the foundry. The functionality of the circuit is correct
only if the key is correct. After the foundry manufactures the locked circuit and
returns it to the designer, the correct key is applied to the circuit by connecting a
tamper-proof memory containing the key to the key inputs. This process is called
activation. Over the years, different types of logic locking mechanisms have been
suggested. Initially, locking involved inserting XOR/XNOR gates in a synthesized
design netlist [87]. Later, techniques based on VLSI testing principles have been
outlined to improve logic locking schemes by manifesting high corruption at the
output bits when an incorrect key is applied [82, 83].
The Boolean satisfiability-based attack, a.k.a. SAT attack [102] was a game
changer and became the basis of many variants [17, 95, 94]. SAT provides a strong
mathematical formulation to find the correct locking key of a logic locked IC which
prunes out wrong keys in an iterative manner. In each iteration, an input (called
the Distinguishing Input, or DI) is chosen by the SAT solver and all the wrong keys
that corrupt the output of this DI are pruned out. All wrong keys are pruned out
when no more DI can be found. Point function (PF)-based logic locking, including
SARLock [128] and Anti-SAT [119, 121], force the number of SAT iterations to be
exponential in the key size by pruning out only a very small number of wrong keys
in each iteration. However, PF-based locking schemes have a drawback that there
are very few (or only one) input minterms whose output is incorrect for each wrong
key. Hence the overall error rate of the locked circuit with a wrong key is very small.
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This disadvantage is captured by approximate SAT attacks such as AppSAT [94]
and Double-DIP [95]. These attack schemes are able to find an approximate key
(approx-key) which makes the locked circuit behave correctly for most (but not all)
of the input values. Another kind of popular attack against logic locking schemes
is removal attacks [130, 131]. In a removal attack, the attacker tries to find the
logic locking module, remove it, and replace its output with a constant 0 or 1. The
key step in this attack is to identify the output wire of the locking module. This
can be achieved by structural analysis assisted by calculating the signal probability
skew (SPS) of each wire [131]. Locking techniques such as Anti-SAT [119] is most
vulnerable to this type of attack since the correct functionality of the original circuit
can be obtained by removing the Anti-SAT module and replacing its output with 0.
More recently, Yasin et al. proposed stripped functionality logic locking (SFLL)
which allows the designer to select a set of protected input patterns that are affected
by almost all the wrong keys while other input patterns are affected by very few
wrong keys [133]. SFLL is not vulnerable to removal attack since the function-
ality of the original circuit for the protected input patterns has been modified in
SFLL. However, when the number of protected patterns increases, SAT attacks
need significantly fewer iterations to find the correct key. Essentially, SFLL creates
a fundamental trade-off between SAT resilience (i.e., SAT attack complexity) and
effectiveness (i.e., the amount of error injected by a wrong key). This trade-off
is problematic. On the one hand, if only very few input patterns are protected, a
wrong key may not inject enough error into the circuit and useful work may still be
done using the chip, rendering locking ineffective. On the other hand, having more
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protected input patterns will compromise the circuit’s SAT resilience. Moreover.
as we move into the machine learning (ML) era, error-resilient applications are
becoming increasingly relevant since most ML-based applications usually embody
substantial amount of error resilience. Hence small amount of error in the hardware
(introduced by incorrect keys and/or hardware simplification) may not necessarily
impact the overall application accuracy. With SFLL, if we want to ensure a very
high corruption at the hardware level (for wrong keys), the resiliency to SAT would
inevitably reduce. Addressing this dilemma is the main theme of our paper.
We propose Strong Anti-SAT (SAS) to address the challenges in achieving
high effectiveness without sacrificing SAT resilience. On one hand, SAS ensures
that, given any wrong (including approximate) key, the error injected by locking
circuitry will have significant application-level impact. On the other hand, SAS is
provably resilient to SAT attacks (i.e., requiring exponential time). Based on SAS,
we also propose Robust SAS (RSAS), a variant of SAS that is not vulnerable to
removal attacks and has the same SAT resilience and effectiveness as SAS. This
makes RSAS a substantial improvement over the limitations posed by SAS. The
contribution of this work is as follows.
1. We prove the fundamental trade-off between SAT resilience and effectiveness
which is applicable to any logic locking scheme.
2. We demonstrate the inability of existing locking techniques to secure hardware
running real-world workloads due to such a trade-off. We show that, when the
longest combinational path (i.e., the multiplier) in a 32-bit 80386 processor
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is locked using SFLL, the processor fails to simultaneously have high SAT
complexity and high application-level impact on both PARSEC [8] and ML-
based application benchmarks.
3. We propose Strong Anti-SAT (SAS) to address this challenge. In SAS, a set
of input minterms that have higher impact on the applications are identified
as critical minterms. We design the locking infrastructure of SAS such that
given a wrong key, the critical minterms are more likely to introduce error
in the circuit and hence result in an application-level error. We also prove
that the SAT complexity is exponential in the number of key bits and does
not deteriorate when the number of critical minterms increases. This is a
substantial improvement over SFLL.
4. We also propose a removal attack resistant variant of SAS, called Robust SAS
(RSAS). RSAS is designed such that it achieves the same SAT resilience and
effectiveness levels as SAS and if the locking module of RSAS is removed, the
remaining circuit will exhibit incorrect functionality for critical minterms.
5. Experiment results show that, when locked using the same number of critical
minterms, SAS and RSAS have higher SAT resilience than SFLL and they
have about the same level of effectiveness. In terms of area, power, and delay
overhead, RSAS and SFLL have similar overheads in general and are a little
better than SAS.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 5.2 introduces the back-
ground on SAT attack and existing logic locking schemes. We show that SFLL’s
trade-off makes it incapable to secure real-world applications in Section 5.3. We
then mathematically prove that the trade-off applies to all logic locking schemes in
Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, SAS’s hardware structure is presented and its exponential
SAT attack complexity is proved in theory. The removal attack resistant variant of
SAS, i.e., RSAS, is introduced in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 describes the methodology
to choose critical minterms. Section 5.8 shows the experimental results which
demonstrate that when the same set of critical minterms are selected by SAS, RSAS,
and SFLL, SAS and RSAS achieve higher security than SFLL while maintaining
similar application-level effectiveness. Section 5.9 concludes the paper.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Attack Model
Fig. 5.1 illustrates the threat model we consider which is consistent with the
latest papers in the logic locking field [119, 128, 18, 94, 120, 118, 133, 61, 135, 116].
The attacker can be either an untrusted foundry or an untrusted user who has the
ability to reverse engineer the fabricated chip, obtaining the locked gate-level netlist.
The attacker is considered to have the following resources:
1. The locked gate-level netlist of the circuit under attack. This can be obtained
by reverse engineering the GDS-II file (which the foundry has) or a fabricated
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Figure 5.1: The targeted attack model of logic locking
2. An activated chip. The attacker is considered to own an activated chip (i.e.,
the one loaded with the correct key) since such a chip can be purchased from
the open market.
In general, logic locking research does not assume that the attacker is able to
insert probes into the activated circuit, i.e., to observe the intermediate values. This
is because protection schemes (e.g. analog shield [69]) can counter probing attacks.
5.2.2 SAT Attack
For any combinational digital circuit, the functionality can be expressed using
a Boolean function F : ~X → ~Y where ~X and ~Y are the primary input and output,
respectively. The logic locked circuit FL takes one more input, the key input ~K, in
addition to the primary input. If ~K is correct, then ∀ ~X, F ( ~X) = FL( ~X, ~K). F ( ~X)
may not be equal to FL( ~X, ~K) if ~K is incorrect. As stated earlier, the key is stored
tamper-proof memory and is not accessible to the attacker.
The Boolean satisfiability-based attack, a.k.a. SAT attack is a strong the-
oretical formulation to find the correct key of a locked circuit. In the context
of the SAT attack, we use the Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF): C( ~X, ~K, ~Y ) to
characterize Boolean satisfiability: C( ~X, ~K, ~Y ) = TRUE if ~X, ~K, and ~Y satisfy
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~Y = FL( ~X, ~K), where FL stands for the Boolean functionality of the locked circuit.
C( ~X, ~K, ~Y ) = FALSE otherwise. SAT attacks run iteratively and prune out incorrect
keys in every iteration. The attack consists of the following steps:
1. In the initial iteration, the attacker looks for a primary input, ~X1, and two
keys, ~Kα and ~Kβ, such that the locked circuit produces two different outputs
~Yα and ~Yβ:
C( ~X1, ~Kα, ~Yα) ∧ C( ~X1, ~Kβ, ~Yβ) ∧ (~Yα 6= ~Yβ) (5.1)
~X1 is called the Distinguishing Input (DI).
2. The DI, ~X1, is applied to the activated circuit (the oracle) and the output ~Y1
is recorded. Note that ~Kα, ~Yα, and ~Kβ, ~Yβ are not recorded. Only the DI and
its correct output are carried over to the following iterations.
3. In the ith iteration, a new DI and a pair of keys, ~Kα and ~Kβ, are found. The
newly found ~Kα and ~Kβ should produce correct outputs for all the DIs found
in previous iterations. To this end, we append a clause to Eq. (5.1):
C( ~Xi, ~Kα, ~Yα) ∧ C( ~Xi, ~Kβ, ~Yβ) ∧ (~Yα 6= ~Yβ)
i−1∧
j=1
(C( ~Xj, ~Kα, ~Yj) ∧ C( ~Xj, ~Kβ, ~Yj))
(5.2)
In this way, all the wrong keys that corrupt the output of previously found
DIs (i.e., the output is different from that of the activated chip) are pruned
out from the search space.
4. SAT solves Eq. (5.2) repeatedly until no more DI can be found, i.e., Eq. (5.2)
is not satisfiable any more.
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5. In this case, there is no more DI. The output of the SAT attack is a key ~K
that produces the same output as the activated circuit to all the DIs, which
can be expressed using the following CNF:
λ∧
i=1
C( ~Xi, ~K, ~Yi) (5.3)
where λ is the total number of SAT iterations.
Note that there can be multiple correct keys: some keys can be different from
but functionally equivalent to the actual key in the activated chip.
Theorem 5.1. SAT is guaranteed to find a correct key ~Kc to the locked circuit.
Proof. This can be proved by contradiction: suppose the key returned by the last
step of SAT attack is a wrong key. This implies that there must exist a primary
input ~X such that
C( ~X, ~Kc, ~Yc) ∧ C( ~X, ~K, ~Y ) ∧ (~Yc 6= ~Y )
where ~K is the actual key, ~Yc is the output with returned key ~Kc and ~Y is the correct
output according to the actual key ~K. ~X cannot be a previously found DI because
otherwise ~Kc will not satisfy (5.3). We can see that ~X qualifies for a DI: just assign
~Kα = ~Kc and ~Kβ = ~K. This means that (5.2) is still satisfiable and contradicts the
criteria that no more DI can be found before the SAT attack goes to the final step.
Hence proved.
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5.2.3 Existing Logic Locking Schemes
Multiple logic locking schemes have been proposed to thwart the SAT at-
tack [132, 119, 121, 133, 128]. There are two ways to mitigate the SAT attack:
one is to increase the time for each SAT iteration and the other is to increase
the number of SAT iterations. The former requires either AES blocks [132] or
reconfigurable logic [49], which is impractical for most circuits. The other approach
is to exponentially increase the number of SAT iterations. This approach is also not
perfect because a locking scheme must be rather ineffective to improve security. This
is the case for Anti-SAT [119, 121], SARLock [128], and and TTL [129]. All these
techniques are vulnerable to the approximate SAT attacks (such as AppSAT [94]
and Double-DIP [95]).
The state-of-the-art, stripped functionality logic locking (SFLL) [133], explores
the trade-off between security and effectiveness. SFLL comprises of two parts:
a functionality stripped circuit (FSC) and a restore unit (RU). The FSC is the
original circuit with the functionality modified for a set of protected input cubes.
This modification makes SFLL resistant to removal attack. If the RU is removed,
the FSC’s functionality of protected input cubes is different from the original circuit,
thus making the attack unsuccessful. The RU stores the key, compares the circuit’s
input with the key, and outputs a restore vector which is XOR’ed with the FSC
output. If the key is correct, the restore vector will fix the FSC’s output and
the circuit will have correct output. There are two variants of SFLL: SFLL-HD
and SFLL-flex. SFLL-HD has been successfully attacked by a functional analysis
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based attack [98, 99]. As the latter remains secure, provides higher flexibility in
selecting protected cubes, and is more relevant to SAS, we focus on SFLL-flex
in this paper. An SFLL-flex configuration can be described using the number of
protected cubes, c, and the number of specified bits of each cube, k, denoted as
SFLL-flexc×k. The authors of [133] derived the following characteristics of a circuit
locked with SFLL-flexc×k: (1) the fraction of input minterms whose output will be
corrupted by a wrong key (i.e., the “error rate” of a wrong key) is c ·2−k; and (2) the
probability that a SAT attack finds the correct key within q iterations is q ·2dlog2ce−k.
We illustrate this relationship in Fig. 5.4. As a higher SAT success probability
indicates weaker security, SFLL inherently suffers from a trade-off between security
and effectiveness.
Figure 5.2: The positive correlation between the error rate of wrong keys and the
probability that SAT finds the correct key in certain iterations
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5.3 Insufficiency of SFLL for Real-World Applications
In this section, we investigate the application-level effectiveness of SFLL [133].
Specifically, we lock the multiplier within a 32-bit 80386 processor since it is the
largest combinational component. The application-level impact is evaluated using
both generic and neural network (NN)-based benchmarks. We emphasize NN-based
applications because they are inherently error-resilient and hence are more difficult
to protect using logic locking. Details of the benchmarks are listed in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Application benchmark details
Benchmark Type Quantity Content
Generic Applications 9 The PARSEC Benchmark Suite [8]
Neural Networks 5 MNIST [53], SVHN [68], CIFAR10 [51], ILSVRC-2012 [25], Oxford102 [70]
In order to evaluate the application-level impact of a logic locking scheme, we
modify the GEM5 [10] simulator so that error is injected into the locked processor
module according to the hardware error profile due to the wrong key. In this way,
the circuit-level error induced by an incorrect (including approximate) key can be
evaluated at the application level. This framework is illustrated in Fig. 5.3 which is
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Figure 5.3: Our experimental framework
82
SFLL allows the designer to explore the trade-off between effectiveness and
SAT resilience. We show that a “sweet spot” does not exist. In our experiments, we
lock the multiplier with various SFLL configurations, each having a different level
of SAT resilience, quantified by the average SAT iterations to unlock (as the X axis
in Fig. 5.4). The effectiveness of each locking scheme is evaluated by running the
PARSEC and NN benchmarks on the locked processors loaded with approximate
keys. The percentage of PARSEC benchmark runs with incorrect outcome and the
accuracy loss of NN models are used as the criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of
each locking configuration. The trade-off is illustrated in Fig. 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: SAT resiliency vs. locking effectiveness trade-off. Left: PARSEC benchmarks.
Right: NN benchmarks.
From Fig. 5.4, we observe that the wrong keys’ impact decreases with the
increase in SAT resiliency. In order to have a visible accuracy drop for the most
error-resilient benchmarks, the SFLL locked processor cannot endure more than
roughly 1000 SAT iterations. Such a locking scheme is extremely vulnerable since
1000 SAT iterations can be fulfilled within minutes. Therefore, a logic locking
scheme that ensures high application-level impact without sacrificing SAT resiliency
is needed.
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5.4 Fundamental Trade-off for All Logic Locking Schemes
This section generalizes the trade-off of SFLL to all logic locking schemes.
We start with definitions of concepts and then prove the relationship between SAT
resilience and effectiveness.
Definition 5.1 (Corrupt). We say that a key ~K corrupts a primary input minterm
~X if and only if the locked circuit produces a different output to ~X from the original
circuit’s output, i.e., FL( ~X, ~K) 6= F ( ~X).
Definition 5.2 (Error Rate). The error rate ε ~K of a wrong key
~K is the portion
of primary input minterms corrupted by the key ~K.




where n is the number of bits in the primary input. We use ε to denote the average







Definition 5.3 (Corruptibility). The corruptibility γ ~X of a primary input minterm
~X is the portion of wrong keys that corrupt this minterm.
Let K ~X be the set of wrong keys that corrupts the primary input minterm ~X












Let us illustrate the above concepts with the following example. We consider
a circuit with two primary input bits (x0, x1) and locked with a two-bit key (k0, k1),
as shown in Fig. 5.5. Table 5.2 is the truth table for each possible primary input
and key input combinations. If a key corrupts a primary input, the corresponding








Original Circuit Locked Circuit
Figure 5.5: An example of logic locking, with the original circuit on the left and the locked
circuit on the right.
Table 5.2: Truth table of the locked circuit in Fig. 5.5
~K = (0, 0) ~K = (0, 1) ~K = (1, 1) ~K = (1, 0) Correct y γ ~X γ




~X = (0, 1) 1 0(7) 1 0(7) 1 2
3
~X = (1, 1) 0 1(7) 0 1(7) 0 2
3










In Table 5.2, we also calculate the error rate of each key, the corruptibility of
each input minterm, and their averages. We can also observe that both the average
error rate and average corruptibility equal 2
3
. It turns out that this equality is
universal in logic locking:
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Theorem 5.2. The average error rate of all wrong keys equals the average corrupt-







































Therefore, in order to prove ε = γ, we only need to prove
∑
~K∈KW
|X ~K | =
∑
~X∈{0,1}n
|K ~X | (5.4)
Let us consider the following bipartite graph G = (X ,KW , E) where X is {0, 1}n
which is the set of all the possible input minterms, KW is the set of wrong keys, and
E = {( ~X, ~K)| ~X ∈ X and ~K ∈ KW , ~K corrupts ~X}. Both sides of Eq. 5.4 denote
the total number of elements in E and hence must be equal.
Let λ be the number of SAT iterations that a SAT attacker needs to find the
correct key.




Proof. In each SAT iteration, the average number of wrong keys pruned by the DI
~X is upper bounded by γ|KW | (because some of the wrong keys may have already









Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 explicitly point out that there exists an inverse relation-
ship between ε and the lower bound of E[λ]. This quantifies the trade-off between
them. This trade-off applies to any logic locking scheme. Note that different input
minterms may inject a different amount of error at the application level. By assigning
higher corruptibility to a few minterms with high application-level impact, we can
achieve high effectiveness while maintaining high SAT resilience by keeping γ low
and E[λ] high. This is the main intuition behind SAS.
5.5 The Architecture and Properties of SAS
In Sec. 5.3 and 5.4, we demonstrated that two competing objectives exist for
all logic locking schemes:
1. Effectiveness: Any incorrect key should have a high appli-cation-level error
impact.
2. SAT resilience: The complexity of determining the correct key via SAT
attacks should be very high.
In this section, we introduce Strong Anti-SAT (SAS) logic locking scheme
which aims to achieve both objectives simultaneously. SAS guarantees an expo-
nential expected SAT solving time while having a large impact on the accuracy of
real-world applications. In SAS, instead of uniformly distributing the error across
all possible inputs, we identify certain input patterns which potentially have a
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higher impact on the overall application-level error. We call these inputs critical
minterms. SAS is configured in such a way that any incorrect key corrupts at least
1 critical minterm. For the other minterms, the corruptibility is low.
5.5.1 The SAS Block
LetM be the set of critical minterms and m = |M| be the number of critical
minterms. For the ease of implementation, we always choose m to be a power of 2.
The basic locking infrastructure is the SAS block which is illustrated in Fig. 5.6.
The key ~K of an n-bit SAS block consists of two n-bit sub-keys, ~K1 and ~K2. In
order to describe the mechanism of the SAS locking scheme clearly, we use a reverse



















Figure 5.6: The Architecture of SAS Configuration 1 with the Details of the SAS Block
YSAS is the output of the SAS block. If YSAS = 1, a fault will be injected
into the original circuit. g is a function with an on-set-size of 1, i.e., only one input
minterm will have output 1 and all others will have output 0. ḡ has the opposite
functionality of g. A function block ~X ′ = H( ~X, ~K1) is inserted before g and ḡ and
it works as follows. If ~X is not a critical minterm, then ~X ′ = ~X. In this case, only
one combination of ~K1 will make g output 1, therefore ~X has a low corruptibility.
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If ~X is a critical minterm, then for a portion of ~K1, ~X is adjusted according to
~K1 to obtain ~X
′ such that g( ~X ′, ~K1) = 1 and hence the corruptibility is increased.
~X ′ = H( ~X, ~K1) further ensures that the wrong keys that corrupts each critical
minterm are mutually exclusive and evenly partition the set of wrong keys. More
specifically, as the partitioning is based on the ~K1 part of the key, we have the
following. Let K1~X = {
~K1|∀ ~K2 such that ( ~K1, ~K2) ∈ KW , ( ~K1, ~K2) ∈ K ~X}. Then
we have
∀ ~X1, ~X2 ∈M, |K1~X1| = |K
1
~X2









where n is the number of bits in ~X, ~K1, and ~K2. This effect is illustrated in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Illustration of how m critical minterms partition the set of wrong keys









· · · ~k2n
critical
minterms
~X1 • • •
~X2 • • •










The 2 configurations of SAS will be introduced in the rest of this section.
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5.5.2 Configuration 1: SAS with One SAS Block
This configuration is illustrated in Fig. 5.6. In this configuration, there is
one SAS block. As the critical minterms evenly partition the set of wrong keys,
the corruptibility of each critical minterm is γc =
1
m
. Below we derive the SAT
resilience of this configuration assuming that the SAT solver chooses a DI uniformly
at random in each iteration. This is a common assumption [129, 133, 92]. The SAT
resilience is quantified using the expected number of SAT iterations E[λ]. To start
with, we give 2 useful lemmas.
Lemma 5.4. Let Di be the set of DIs that have been chosen in the first i iterations
and ~X be a primary input minterm. If K ~X ⊂
⋃
~X′∈Di K ~X′ , then ~X cannot be the
DI of any SAT iteration beyond i.
Proof. Recall that Equation (5.2) gives the SAT formula for each SAT iteration:
C( ~Xi, ~Kα, ~Yα) ∧ C( ~X1, ~Kβ, ~Yβ) ∧ (~Yα 6= ~Yβ)
i−1∧
j=1
(C( ~Xj, ~Kα, ~Yj) ∧ C( ~Xj, ~Kβ, ~Yj))
To satisfy the first line, at one of ~Kα and ~Kβ must be a wrong key that corrupts ~X.
However, since any wrong key that corrupts ~X also corrupts at least 1 previously
found DI, this wrong key cannot satisfy the second line. Hence such ~X cannot be
the DI in future iterations.
Lemma 5.5. For SAS Configuration 1, any critical minterm must exist in the set
of DIs when SAT finishes: ~X ∈ Dλ ∀ ~X ∈ M, where λ is the total number of SAT
iterations and Dλ is the set of all DIs.
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Proof. Recall that g has on-set size 1. Let ~P be the very input that makes g(~P ) = 1.
∀ ~X ∈ M, let ~K1 = ~X ⊕ ~P . Then, any ~K = ( ~K1, ~K2) ∈ KW is a wrong key that
only corrupts ~X. Therefore, ~X has to be chosen as a DI to prune out this wrong
key.





Proof. The total number of SAT iterations equals the total number of DIs. DIs
consist of critical minterms and non-critical minterms. By Lemma 5.5, all the critical
minterms must be in the set of DIs for SAT to terminate. Therefore, we only need
to find the expected number of non-critical minterms that are chosen as DIs. As
illustrated in Table 5.3, ∀ ~X ′ /∈ M, ∃ exactly one ~X ∈ M such that K ~X′ ⊂ K ~X . By
Lemma 5.4, if this ~X is chosen as DI before ~X ′, then ~X ′ cannot be chosen in further
iterations any more. In other words, ~X ′ will count towards the total number of
iterations only when it is chosen before the critical minterm ~X. By our assumption
that the DI is chosen uniformly at random in each iteration, ~X ′ has a probability of
1
2
to be chosen as DI before ~X is chosen. As this is true for any non-critical minterm,
the expected number of SAT iterations is E[λ] = 1
2
(2n −m) +m = 2n+m
2
.
5.5.3 Configuration 2: SAS with Multiple Blocks
In this configuration, we have l SAS blocks as illustrated in Fig. 5.7. Each SAS
block takes an n-bit primary input ~X, which is shared among all the SAS blocks,
and a 2n-bit key input. The output of each SAS block is XOR’ed with a wire in
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the original circuit. Therefore, a fault is injected into the original circuit if any SAS
block has output 1. Let Mj be the set of critical minterms for the jth SAS block ,
j = 1, 2, . . . , l. For ease of implementation, we choose l also to be a power of 2 and
l ≤ m. The relationship between Mj and the total set of critical minterms M is
thatM1,M2, . . . ,Ml have the same cardinality, are mutually exclusive, and evenly
partition M, i.e.,




In this way, each SAS block has m
l
critical minterms. As each critical minterm
receives high corruptibility from only one SAS block, the corruptibility of any critical























Figure 5.7: Configuration 2 with l SAS blocks
Lemma 5.7. For SAS Configuration 2, any critical minterm must exist in the set
of DIs when SAT finishes: ~X ∈ Dλ ∀ ~X ∈ M, where λ is the total number of SAT
iterations and Dλ is the set of all DIs.
Proof. This is a natural extension to Lemma 5.5. Let ~X be a critical minterm and
~X ∈ Mj. Recall that g has on-set size 1. Let ~P be the very input that makes
g(~P ) = 1. ∀ ~X ∈ Mj, let ~k = ~X ⊕ ~P . Then, let us consider the following wrong
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key ~K = ( ~K1, ~K2, . . . , ~K l) ∈ KW which is composed as follows: ~Kj = (~k, ~Kj2) ∈ KWj
where KWj is the set of wrong keys for the jth SAS block. For any i = 1, 2, . . . , l that
i 6= j, ~Ki ∈ KCi where KCi is the set of correct keys for the ith SAS block. Such a
key ~K is a wrong key that only corrupts ~X. Therefore, ~X has to be chosen as a DI
to prune out this wrong key.
Below, we will analyze the SAT resilience of this configuration by deriving the
expected number of SAT iterations.
Theorem 5.8. The expected number of SAT iterations of SAS Configuration 2 with
l SAS blocks and m critical minterms is
E[λ] =
l · 2n +m
l + 1
(5.8)
Proof. By Lemma 5.7, every critical minterm must count toward the total number
of SAT iterations. Therefore, we only need to derive the expected number of non-
critical minterms that are chosen as DIs.
For any non-critical minterm ~X ′ /∈ M, in the ith SAS block, there exists
exactly one critical minterm ~Xi such that the set of wrong keys that corrupt ~X ′ in
this SAS block, Ki, ~X′ , is a subset of the set of wrong keys that corrupt ~Xi, Ki, ~Xi .
i.e., Ki, ~X′ ⊂ Ki, ~Xi . As the construction of the SAS block makes this true for any
individual SAS block and the critical minterms for each SAS block are mutually
exclusive, there are a total of l such critical minterms. When all of these l critical
minterms are chosen as DI, they will cover the entire set of wrong keys that corrupt
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~X ′. Therefore, by Lemma 5.4, in order to include ~X ′ in the set of DIs, it must be
selected before all l critical minterms are selected. This holds for any non-critical
minterm.
By our assumption that the DIs are chosen uniformly at random in each SAT
iteration, the probability that each non-critical minterm will be chosen as DI is l
l+1
.
Therefore, the expected number of SAT iterations is E[λ] = l
l+1




The properties of both configurations of SAS are summarized in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Properties of the 2 configurations of SAS









5.6 Robust SAS: a Removal-Resilient SAS Variant
Although SAS achieves desirable SAT resilience and high corruptibility on
critical minterms, it is still vulnerable to removal attack. In such an attack, the
attacker can identify and remove each SAS block and replace their output wires
with constant 0. In this way, the remaining part of the locked circuit will have
correct functionality. In order to address this drawback, we introduce Robust SAS
(RSAS), a variant of SAS that is resilient to removal attacks. In addition to adding
an RSAS function block, RSAS modifies the functionality of the original circuit.
Therefore, unlike SAS, one cannot obtain the correct functionality of the circuit
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by identifying and removing the RSAS block. We will introduce the architecture
of RSAS and show how any SAS configuration can be converted to a functionally
equivalent RSAS configuration. Due to the equivalence in functionality, an RSAS
configuration will have the same SAT resilience and effectiveness as its SAS
counterpart.
5.6.1 RSAS Architecture and Relationship with SAS
A circuit locked by RSAS consists of an altered original circuit and one or more
RSAS block(s). Fig. 5.8 illustrates the RSAS configuration with one RSAS block.
Given the same set of critical minterms and the same number of locking function
blocks, locking a circuit with RSAS and SAS will yield the same functionality.
An RSAS-locked circuit can be obtained by converting a functionally equivalent


















Functionality inverted for 
all critical minterms
Figure 5.8: A circuit locked with one RSAS block, equivalent to SAS Configuration 1
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5.6.1.1 Altering the original circuit
Recall that l is the number of SAS blocks in a SAS configuration. For the
jth SAS block, j = 1, 2, . . . , l, the set of critical minterms it contains is denoted by
Mj and |Mj| = m
l
, where m is the total number of critical minterms. In order
to implement RSAS, we need to modify the original circuit’s functionality. Notice
that, for each SAS block, there is a wire in the original circuit that is XOR’ed with
the SAS block’s output. For the jth SAS block, we locate this wire. For each critical
minterm in Mj, we invert the functionality of critical minterms at this wire. This



















Functionality inverted for 
critical minterms in M1
Functionality inverted 
for critical minterms 
in M l…
Figure 5.9: A circuit locked with multiple RSAS blocks, equivalent to SAS Configuration
2
5.6.1.2 Converting the SAS block into the RSAS block
The RSAS block is very similar to the SAS block and there is only one
difference between them. For the jth SAS block, j = 1, 2, . . . , l, if the primary input
is a critical minterm in Mj, the output of RSAS block, YRSAS,j, is the inversion of
the output of SAS block, YSAS,j. Recall that, for a SAS configuration with m critical





for a portion of l
m
wrong keys, YSAS,j is 1. This is achieved by the ~X
′ = H( ~X, ~K1)
function: if ~X is a critical minterm, then the H( ~X, ~K1) function makes sure that
for γc portion of wrong keys, we will have g( ~X
′ ⊕ ~K1) = 1. For RSAS, since the
functionality for critical minterms is inverted, the portion of wrong keys that makes
YRSAS,j be 1 is 1 − γc = m−lm . This means the functionality of H( ~X, ~K1) needs to
be modified in the following way: if ~X is a critical minterm, then for 1− γc portion
of wrong keys, g( ~X ′ ⊕ ~K1) will output 1. For non-critical input minterms, YRSAS
behaves in the same as YSAS. This is illustrated in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Illustration of RSAS block’s functionality. A ‘•’ stands for YRSAS = 1.









· · · ~k2n
critical
minterms
~X1 • • • • •
~X2 • • • • •
· · · · · ·









5.6.2 SAT Resilience and Effectiveness of RSAS
In Sec. 5.6.1, we introduced how to convert a SAS-locked circuit into an
equivalent RSAS-locked circuit. These steps essentially invert the functionality of
each critical minterm at two places: the first at the wire in the original circuit where
RSAS is integrated, and the other at the RSAS block’s output. Since these two
wires are XOR’ed, the two inversions will cancel out which makes the RSAS-locked
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circuit functionally equivalent to the SAS-locked circuit. Due to the equivalence in
functionality, the derivations of SAS’s SAT resilience and effectiveness will also hold
for RSAS. Therefore, Table 5.4 is also the summary of these properties of RSAS.
5.7 Choosing Critical Minterms
The critical minterms for injecting large errors should be selected judiciously.
A careful analysis of the workload would help identify these typical minterms.
Generally these minterms would be very few as compared to the overall input space
of the functional modules. Here we describe how to select the critical minterms. As
mentioned in Sec. 5.3, we use PARSEC and NN models as application benchmarks.
For the PARSEC (generic) benchmarks, we arbitrarily choose critical minterms from
the input minterms that exist in all the application benchmarks. We take a similar
approach for NN benchmarks. A significant part of an NN-based application is the
weights of the NN model and it turns out that the weight values of most NN models
follow a similar distribution. For example, Figure 5.10 shows the distribution of
weights of the LeNet (MNIST dataset) and CaffeNet (ISLVRC-2012 dataset) models.
These two are the smallest benchmark and the largest benchmark, respectively. The
weight distributions are similar across NN benchmarks and many other NN models.
This kind of similarity can be also found among generic applications.
We select a subset of weight values to be critical minterms based on their
application-lavel impact. The selected critical minterms should cause significant
application-level error. Fig. 5.10 also shows the accuracy loss of the NN model in the
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following experiment: for each input minterm, we measure the accuracy loss of the
NN model when every computation involving this very minterm is corrupted while
no other minterm is corrupted. As the input minterm distributions are similar











































Figure 5.10: Weight distribution (blue histogram, left Y axis) and application-level
accuracy loss (red line, right Y axis) of LeNet and CaffeNet when the corresponding
input is locked
among the same type of applications, the flexibility of SAS allows the designer to
choose a configuration and a combination of critical minterms that work well in
securing the intended applications without compromising the SAT resiliency.
5.8 Experiments & Comparison with SFLL
This section shows the experimental results of SAS and RSAS as well as
the comparison with SFLL. Recall that, as illustrated in Fig. 5.3, we obtain the
gate-level netlists of the multiplier within a 32-bit 80386 processor by synthesizing
the high-level description using Cadence RTL Compiler. Then we lock the netlist
using various SAS and RSAS configurations and SFLL-flex with the same set of
critical minterms. Note that the critical minterms are selected according to the
method described in Sec. 5.7. The architecture-level simulation is conducted by
a modified GEM5 [10] simulator where error is injected into the locked processor
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module according to the hardware error profile due to the wrong key. We conduct
the following experiment to verify the SAT resilience and effectiveness of SAS and
RSAS and compare them with SFLL.
5.8.1 SAT Resilience
We first verify whether the SAT resilience of SAS/RSAS (i.e., the actual
number of SAT iterations) matches what we have derived in Sec. 5.5. The SAT
resilience of SAS/RSAS and SFLL is also compared. We lock the multiplier in a
32-bit 80386 processor with SAS and RSAS as well as SFLL. Fig. 5.11 shows the
actual and expected number of SAT iterations of multipliers locked with SAS and
RSAS. These numbers are compared to the actual number of iterations of SFLL. In
these locking configurations, we use 14 bits of primary input for locking purposes
(n = 14) and experiment with each feasible configuration with up to 4 critical
minterms. We can observe that SAS and RSAS have similar numbers of actual SAT
iterations and they are both close to the expected value. When there is more than
one critical minterms, SAS and RSAS exhibit higher SAT resilience than SFLL.
This is because the corruptibility of each critical minterm in SFLL is almost 1 no
matter how many critical minterms there are. This compromises its SAT resilience.
Fig. 5.12 compares the actual SAT iterations of SAS and SFLL. In Fig. 5.12a,
it can be observed that SAS’s SAT complexity is higher than that of SFLL by a
roughly constant factor when m is fixed at 4. Note that the same set of four critical
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Figure 5.11: Actual and expected number of SAT iterations of SAS and RSAS, compared
with SFLL.
minterms are used for each locking scheme. Among various SAS configurations, a
larger l comes with higher SAT resilience as expected. In Fig. 5.12b, we vary the
critical minterm count (m) from 4 to 32 and demonstrate its impact on the SAT
resilience of SAS and SFLL. While SAS configurations become stronger with more
critical minterms, SFLL becomes weaker. Therefore, SAS is more SAT resilient and
gives designers more flexibility when more critical minterms are needed.
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We evaluate the effectiveness of SAS/RSAS and SFLL at the application level
using PARSEC [8] and ML benchmarks as listed in Table 5.1. Due to the functional
equivalence of SAS and RSAS, they will have the same architecture-level effects and
we use the same functional model to perform architecture-level simulation of SAS
and RSAS. In our experiments, various numbers of critical minterms are locked. The
same set of critical minterms are used for SAS/RSAS and SFLL in each experiment.
The critical minterms are chosen according to the methods described in Sec. 5.7. For
SAS, we choose l = 1 when m = 1 and l = 2 when m ≥ 2. Figs. 5.13 and 5.14 show
that both SAS/RSAS and SFLL are effective at the application level for both generic
and ML-based applications. SAS/RSAS achieves high application-level effectiveness
and exponential SAT resiliency at the same time. Considering that SAS/RSAS’s
SAT resilience is not compromised with the increase in m as opposed to SFLL (as
shown in Figs. 5.11 and 5.12b), SAS/RSAS is a significant improvement over SFLL.
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(a) SAS/RSAS on PARSEC
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(b) SFLL on PARSEC
Figure 5.13: The application-level effectiveness of SAS/RSAS and SFLL on PARSEC and
ML benchmarks
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(b) SFLL on ML
Figure 5.14: The application-level effectiveness of SAS/RSAS and SFLL on PARSEC and
ML benchmarks
5.8.3 Area, Power, and Delay Overhead of SAS, RSAS, and
SFLL
Now that we have demonstrated the SAT resilience of SAS and RSAS and their
application-level effectiveness, we evaluate their area, power, and delay overhead.
The overhead is also compared with SFLL. In our evaluation, we use 32 bits from
the primary input for locking (n = 32) and lock up to 4 critical minterms (m =
1, 2, 4). We synthesize the original and locked circuits using Cadence RTL Compiler
using SAED 90nm process. Figs. 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17 show the area, power, and
delay overhead values, respectively. Compared with SFLL, on average, SAS and
RSAS have 2.22% and 1.49% more area overhead, 0.43% more and 0.04% less
power overhead, 0.93% and 0.71% more delay overhead, respectively. These are
not significant increases in overhead and should be worth the gain in SAT resilience.
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Figure 5.15: Area overhead of SAS and RSAS compared with SFLL
Figure 5.16: Power overhead of SAS and RSAS compared with SFLL
5.9 Summary
In this work, we investigate logic locking techniques to secure both generic
and error-resilient workloads running on locked processors. We motivate our work
by demonstrating the insufficiency of the state-of-the-art logic locking scheme in
securing such applications. We point out that this is due to the fundamental trade-
off between SAT resilience (SAT attack complexity) and effectiveness (error rate
Figure 5.17: Delay overhead of SAS and RSAS compared with SFLL
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of wrong keys) of logic locking. We formally prove this trade-off. In order to
address this dilemma, we propose Strong Anti-SAT (SAS) where a set of critical
minterms are assigned higher corruptibility in order to ensure high application-level
impact. Based on SAS, we also propose Robust SAS (RSAS) to thwart removal
attacks on logic locking. RSAS is functionally equivalent to SAS and has the same
SAT resilience and effectiveness. Experimental results show that SAS and RSAS
secure processors against SAT attack by ensuring exponential SAT attack complexity
and high application-level impact simultaneously given any wrong key. We also
evaluate the area, power, and delay overhead of SAS and RSAS and compare it
with SFLL. It is shown that SAS and RSAS have modest increase in overhead. In
summary, RSAS exhibits a higher SAT resilience than SFLL when multiple critical
minterms are secured, while also maintaining equivalent effectiveness and removal
attack resilience. Therefore, RSAS constitutes a significant improvment over SFLL-
based locking.
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Chapter 6: Cache Side-Channel-based
Reverse Engineering of Neural Networks
In recent years, deep neural networks (DNN) have become an important type
of intellectual property due to their high performance on various classification tasks.
As a result, DNN stealing attacks have emerged. Many attack surfaces have been
exploited, among which cache timing side-channel attacks are hugely problematic
because they do not need physical probing or direct interaction with the victim to
estimate the DNN model. However, existing cache-side-channel-based DNN reverse
engineering attacks rely on analyzing the binary code of the DNN library that must
be shared between the attacker and the victim in the main memory. In reality,
the DNN library code is often inaccessible because 1) the code is proprietary, or
2) memory sharing has been disabled by the operating system. In our work, we
propose GANRED, an attack approach based on the generative adversarial nets
(GAN) framework which utilizes cache timing side-channel information to accurately
recover the structure of DNNs without memory sharing or code access. The benefit
of GANRED is four-fold. 1) There is no need for DNN library code analysis. 2) No
shared main memory segment between the victim and the attacker is needed. 3)
Our attack locates the exact structure of the victim model, unlike existing attacks
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which only narrow down the structure search space. 4) Our attack efficiently scales
to deeper DNNs, exhibiting only linear growth in the number of layers in the victim
DNN.
6.1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNN) have demonstrated exceptional performance in
a multitude of applications such as image classification and speech recognition,
making them a valuable and important form of intellectual property. In order to
protect DNN models, owners often host them on remote servers, restricting users
only to querying the model. Hence, users do not have the details of the model (i.e.,
architecture or weights). However, DNN model theft is still possible in this scenario.
For example, an adversary can exploit side-channel information in order to reverse
engineer the DNN [123, 42, 43, 5, 114, 6, 27, 107]. Under the remote host setting,
cache side-channel shows the most promise. Because the last level cache (LLC)
is shared among each processor core in most modern computer architectures, the
attacker can infer the victim’s cache usage even without interacting with the victim
directly.
Existing cache-based attack focus on reverse engineering the structure of DNNs.
As shown by the variety of prior research aimed at reverse engineering the structure
of DNNs, such as [123, 42, 43], even if these attacks do not decipher the weight
information, knowing the structure of DNNs enables enables weight extraction
attacks [107] and membership inference attacks [96, 62] and improves black-box
adversarial example attacks [75]. Therefore, unlocking the underlying DNN struc-
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ture is a formidable attack. Hong et al. proposed DeepRecon which monitored calls
to selected TensorFlow library functions and observed the layer sequence of DNNs
[42]. Yan et al. proposed Cache Telepathy which substantially narrowed down the
dimension parameter search space of DNNs by obtaining the number of generalized
matrix multiplication (GEMM) operations via cache timing side-channels [123].
They were able to identify 16 possible structures for the VGG-16 DNN [97]. Both
of these attacks required that the attacker and the victim share the DNN’s library
code (e.g. TensorFlow or GEMM library) in main memory (i.e., the library code in
the main memory is mapped to the virtual address spaces of both the attacker and
the victim). However, memory sharing can be disabled by the server’s operating
system and the library code may be proprietary and inaccessible, thereby rendering
these attacks infeasible. Moreover, neither of these attacks could give the DNN
dimension parameters precisely. Instead, they return only the layer sequence or a
set of possible parameter combinations. Since slight differences in DNN structure
may result in a significant difference in accuracy under the same training effort [43],
obtaining the exact structure of the victim DNN is crucial. Other existing DNN
reverse engineering attacks require querying the victim DNN model [43, 107] or any
physical side-channel probing [43, 5, 114, 6, 27]. These are not required by GANRED
either. Therefore, GANRED can be carried out in a more realistic scenario.
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6.1.1 GANRED Attack Overview
In our work, we develop GANRED, a novel generative adversarial nets (GAN)-
based [32] Rereverse Engineering attack on DNNs which is capable of both fully
recovering the dimension parameters of a DNN and does not require shared library
access. For this attack, the victim DNN’s cache side-channel information is measured
by the attacker and acts as the ground truth of the GAN using a cache side-channel
attack technique called Prime+Probe [73, 38, 79]. This technique does not require
any shared main memory segment between the attacker and the victim.
The attacker builds another DNN and updates the structure of this DNN
repeatedly to make its structure equivalent to the victim DNN. In the rest of the
paper, we refer to the victim’s DNN as VDNN and the attacker’s DNN
as ADNN. In order to achieve his/her objective, the attacker needs to find the
correct structure of each layer before moving on to the next layer. This is done as
follows. The attacker initializes the ADNN as a one-layer network. For each feasible
structure of this layer, the generator measures the cache side-channel of the ADNN
in the same way as the VDNN is measured (i.e., using Prime+Probe).
The discriminator compares the cache side-channel information of the VDNN
and the ADNN and indicates for how many clock cycles the two DNNs produce
identical side-channel information. If the ADNN has the correct structure, i.e., the
same structure as the first layer of the VDNN, then the ADNN’s cache side-channel
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information should be identical to the VDNN’s first layer, and the discriminator will
indicate that the side-channel information of the two DNNs is identical throughout
the period that the ADNN runs.
The validator compares the discriminator’s output with a theoretical running
time of the ADNN estimated using a linear regression analysis. This effectively
rules out the ADNN structures that cause its cache side-channel to diverge from
the the VDNN’s in the middle of the ADNN’s execution. The attacker chooses the
structure that produces accurate cache side-channel data for the longest time as the
first ADNN layer.
In order to search for the structure of VDNN’s second layer, similar operations
are done. Each feasible structure of the second layer is appended to the (now known)
first layer to compose a two-layer ADNN whose cache side-channel is measured
by the generator. The discriminator compares the cache side-channel information
of the two DNNs and the validator determines whether the added matching time
agrees with the theoretical runinng time of the second layer. The structure of each
successive layer is recovered in this way until an ADNN is recovered that produces
identical cache side-channel for the entirety of each DNN’s execution. The attack is
considered successful if ADNN’s final structure is the same as the VDNN’s structure.
6.1.2 Contributions
The contributions of this work are as follows:
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• We propose the GANRED framework where DNNs are characterized by their
accesses to a cache set over time. Our technique does not need any shared
main memory segment between the victim and the attacker or analyze the
DNN library codes on the server. Both resources were required by existing
cache side-channel based DNN structure reverse engineering attacks [123, 42].
GANRED does not require querying the victim DNN model or any physical
probing either, as required in other existing DNN reverse engineering attacks
[43, 5, 114, 6, 27, 107]. Hence, GANRED can be carried out in a more realistic
scenario where these privileges are not granted.
• We prove the following theoretical basis for GANRED. If the ADNN has the
same structure as the first l layers of the VDNN, then both DNNs should
produce identical cache side-channel information throughout these l layers.
• We show that our attack produces the exact structure of each VDNN model.
This has not been achieved by existing DNN reverse engineering attacks based
on cache side-channels [123, 42].
• We prove that the runtime of GANRED scales linearly in the number of DNN
layers. This makes our attack scalable to much deeper DNNs.
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6.2 Background
6.2.1 Dimension Parameters of Deep Neural Networks
Deep neural networks (DNN) are a supervised classification technique that
consists of a sizable number of cascaded layers. Let i and l denote the layer number
and the total number of layers, respectively, hence i ∈ [l]. In each layer, the input
feature map (IFM) (a.k.a. the set of input neurons) is transferred into the output
feature map (OFM) (a.k.a. the set of output neurons) via an operation which
involves a set of filters. The IFM and OFM sizes (i.e., number of contained neurons)
of layer i are denoted by zini and z
out
i , respectively. Note that the OFM of the
previous layer is the IFM of the next layer.
Most DNNs consist of two types of layers: fully connected (FC) layers and
convolutional (Conv) layers. The IFM and OFM of FC layers are (1-dimensional)
vectors whose lengths are zini and z
out
i , respectively. The weights consist of a matrix
of dimension zini × zouti . The structure of a Conv layer is illustrated in Fig. 6.1.
The IFM and OFM of a Conv layer are both 3-dimensional arrays. The width and
height of a feature map are usually equal. There are a set of filters in the Conv
layer and each of them is also a 3-dimensional array. Each filter is convolved with
the IFM to obtain a channel in the OFM. A Conv layer can be characterized by
a set of dimension parameters as listed in Table 6.1. Note that a Conv layer can
be followed by an optional pooling layer and, if so, we consider pooling as a part of
the Conv layer. We define the parameter Pi as the indicator of whether there is a



















Figure 6.1: Illustration of a convolutional layer. “*” indicates inner product, each
computing an output neuron.







i IFM/OFM depth (number of channels)
wfi , δi convolution filter width and stride
Pi indicator of pooling layer existence





Table 6.1: List of dimension parameters of a layer
6.2.2 Cache Architecture Fundamentals
Cache is a type of on-chip storage for processors which temporarily stores a
subset of the main memory’s content in order to reduce memory access latency and
improve the processor’s efficiency. The basic component of cache is a cache block
(also called a cache line). Most modern processors have a set associative cache
where the cache is divided into multiple ways, each having the same number of
blocks. For example, Fig. 6.2 illustrates a two-way set associative cache. The cache
blocks in the same position of each way constitute a set. The organization of address
bits is given in Fig. 6.2. When a block is to be moved into the cache, the cache
controller will extract the set index bits from the block’s address and put the block
into an available slot in the according cache set. If no slot is available in the set,
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Figure 6.2: A two-way set associative cache example
the controller will select a block within the set to be replaced with the new block
according to the replacement policy. The most commonly used replacement policy
is to replace the least recently used (LRU) block.
In modern multi-core processors, the cache has a hierarchy of multiple levels.
We specifically focus on the last level cache (LLC) since it is shared among all the
processor cores. Hence the LLC is used by every program running on the processor,
no matter which core the program runs on.
6.2.3 Cache Timing Side-Channel Attacks
In a cache timing side-channel attack, the attacker and the victim are two
processes running on the same processor. The attacker seeks information leakage
about the victim process by exploiting a fundamental property of cache: a cache
hit is fast and a cache miss is slow. Although a lot of attack techniques have been
proposed, most of them can be described as a three-step process [26]:
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1. The attacker initializes the state of a cache location.
2. The victim program executes, which may modify the state of the attacker-
initialized cache location.
3. The attacker accesses the same cache location again and observes the access
latency. By doing so, he/she can infer whether the victim has accessed the
initialized cache location.
These attacks can be categorized by whether data is shared between the attacker
and victim processes.
6.2.3.1 Attacks based on Data Sharing
Flush+Reload is the major type of attack in this category [127, 126, 37].
These attacks require shared data between the attacker and the victim which can
be achieved when the operating system allows multiple processes to map their
individual virtual addresses to the same physical address for commonly required
resources (e.g. library files) [39]. This sharing enables the attacker to obtain the
victim’s library usage information via cache timing side-channel. The 3 steps of
Flush+Reload are as follows:
1. Flush: The attacker targets an address within shared memory and calls clflush
(an X86 instruction) to flush the cache line (i.e., block) that contains this
address if such a cache line exists. Otherwise clflush has no effect.
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2. The victim process runs. The content of the targeted address will be brought
back to the same cache location if accessed by the victim.
3. Reload: The attacker accesses the targeted address and infers whether a cache
hit or a cache miss occurs based on the access latency. If the victim has
accessed the flushed address, a cache hit will occur. Otherwise, a cache miss
occurs.
6.2.3.2 Attacks without Data Sharing
Many cache timing side-channel attacks work without shared main memory.
Because there is a many-to-one mapping from main memory to cache, the attacker’s
and the victim’s physical addresses can map to the same last level cache (LLC)
location. In this way, the attacker can still detect the changes in cache state made
by the victim. Examples of such attacks are Prime+Probe [73, 38, 79], Evict+Time
[73], and cache collision-based attacks [12]. Among these attacks, Prime+Probe is
the best known and most widely used. Its mechanism is as follows:
1. Prime: the attacker fills the cache sets of interest with his/her own data.
2. The victim program runs which may or may not overwrite the primed cache
sets.
3. Probe: The attacker accesses the primed cache sets and observes timing. A
cache miss indicates that the victim has accessed that cache set.
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Note that probing automatically primes the cache again which enables the attacker
to monitor the cache for a long period.
6.2.4 Existing DNN Reverse Engineering Attacks and De-
fenses
Reverse engineering of neural models has become a real threat which has at-
tracted several researchers’ attention. Among this body of work, a variety of distinct
attack approaches have been explored to reverse engineering neural models. Yan et
al. and Hong et al. independently proposed neural network reverse engineering
techniques based on cache side-channels [123, 42]. In their attacks, the attacker
needs to analyze the neural model’s library code, extract the control flow, and
select code lines to measure cache timing. These lines represent certain functions
that are called when the neural network is running. By monitoring these function
calls, information about the victim DNN’s structure can be extracted. DeepRecon
by Hong et al. inserted probes into the TensorFlow library code and was able
to tell the number of layers and the type of each layer in DNNs [42]. In Yan et
al. ’s Cache Telepathy attack, the generalized matrix multiply (GEMM) backend
libraries were monitored and they were able to reduce the DNN structure search
space significantly [123]. For example, only 16 possible structures of the VGG-16
DNN [97] are still feasible after their attack. DeepRecon uses Flush+Reload which
requires the attacker and victim to share the main memory segment that contains
TensorFlow library files. Cache Telepathy can be done using either Flush+Reload
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or Prime+Probe. However, even the Prime+Probe version requires a shared main
memory segment for the GEMM library files. This might not be a realistic attack
scenario: the operating system can disable memory sharing between different users
or processes, and the attacker may not have access to the server’s DNN library code.
In addition to cache side-channel, power/electromagnetic side-channels [5, 114,
6] and timing side-channel [27] have also been exploited to reverse engineer neural
models. However, these attacks require physically probing the hardware and are
feasible only when such probing is possible. Tramèr et al. proposed a technique
to steal neural models from remote servers through prediction APIs provided by
the server [107]. A countermeasure proposed by Juuti et al. detects such model
extraction attacks with a statistical technique [47]. Hua et al. found out that
the neural network can be reverse engineered from its memory access pattern [43].
Provably secure memory access protocol [56] and secure neural accelerator designs
[113] can defend against this attack.
Many DNN protection techniques have been developed. Homomorphic encryp-
tion (HE) [13, 15, 30, 115] and secure multi-party computation (MPC) [86, 66, 72]
have been employed to ensure the privacy of both the neural model and the input
data. However, even the state-of-the-art HE and MPC algorithms are still too
complex to use in practice. Additionally, several works have proposed the use
of secure enclaves for DNN operations (such as Intel SGX) [106, 36]. However,
DNNs running in these enclaves are vulnerable to cache side-channel attacks as
well [112, 35]. In summary, there has not been an effective countermeasure against
cache-based DNN reverse engineering.
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6.3 Attack Model
In our attack model, the VDNN runs on a server alongside the attacker which is
another process on the same server. The attacker’s goal is to reverse engineer
the structure of the victim DNN model. We consider a realistic threat model
under which the attacker process does not have the privileges assumed by many
prior works such as code access, memory sharing, or physical probing [123, 42, 43,
5, 114, 6, 27, 107]. The resources available to the attacker are as follows:
• Shared last-level cache (LLC) with the victim. This is the case for most
state-of-the-art computer architectures. Shared LLC enables the attacker to
obtain cache side-channel information of another process, e.g. the victim
DNN, using Prime+Probe.
• High-level APIs of the machine learning framework. This is available to the
attacker when he/she acts as a regular user on the server. This enables the
attacker to construct a DNN model.
With these two resources, the attacker can obtain the cache side-channel information
of both VDNN and that of ADNN using Prime+Probe. Note that these are only a
small subset of the attackers’ resources in prior attack models [123, 42, 43, 5, 114,
6, 27, 107]. We assume that the attacker does not have any of the following
privileges:
• Querying VDNN. These are normally unavailable to the attacker unless the
victim grants permission. However, [43, 107] both require this access.
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• The library code of the machine learning framework (e.g. TensorFlow),
since the library may contain intellectual property of the server and users only
need high level APIs to build their neural model. Lacking code access makes
the attacks in [123, 42] infeasible since they need to find specific functions in
the code to insert probe.
• Shared main memory that stores the machine learning library code. This
is also needed by [123, 42] in order to map the shared library to the attacker’s
own virtual memory space and implement Flush+Reload.
• Physical access to the processor. This access is not available when the
server is not controlled by the attacker. This makes any side-channel other
than cache side-channel impossible to measure and renders the attacks in [5,
114, 6, 27, 43] infeasible.
In summary, we assume a scenario where the resources available to an attacker are
very constrained. None of the existing reverse engineering attacks [123, 42, 43, 5,
114, 6, 27, 107] are possible in this setting. However, in this work, we show that
even under such constraints, there is still substantial information leakage about the
DNN model through the cache timing side-channel. GANRED reverse engineers the
DNN structure by utilizing this information. A server’s security measures, such as
restricting queries to the victim, and eliminating memory sharing or library code
access, will disable existing attacks but not hide the side-channel information that
is sufficient for GANRED.
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6.4 Attack Methodology
In this section, we introduce the GANRED framework details. In Sec. 6.4.1, we
present how to characterize a DNN using Prime+Probe results. Sec 6.4.2 describes
how each component of the GANRED framework works. Sec. 6.4.3 introduces the
overall algorithm of GANRED. Sec. 6.4.4 details how the validator utilizes a linear
regression analysis to estimate the running time of a layer based on its structure.
Sec. 6.4.5 proves the premise of GANRED that, if the ADNN has l layers and its
structure is the same as the first l layers of the VDNN, then the ADNN should
produce identical cache side-channel information as the VDNN’s until the ADNN’s
execution ends.
6.4.1 Obtaining DNN’s Cache Side-Channel Trace
Before we talk about the details of GANRED, we describe what side-channel
information about a DNN can be obtained from Prime+Probe. The discussion of
this subsection holds for both the VDNN and the ADNN.
During Prime+Probe, the attacker selects an arbitrary LLC set and
focuses only on this set. This is because we find that each DNN that we study
leaves almost the same access pattern on each LLC set. In the rest of this paper,
unless otherwise noted, our discussion is focused on this very LLC set. Suppose
that the DNN makes s memory accesses to this LLC set during its entire execution.
Let us use tj to denote the time at which the j-th access occurs, where j is the
index of the access (1 ≤ j ≤ s). Note that time is measured using CPU clock
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cycles throughout this paper. Also, note that tj’s are not deterministic. This is
because the DNN’s execution is scheduled by the computer’s operating system and
the scheduling can be affected by other programs running on the same computer.
Let us define Xj as the time between the DNN’s (j−1)-th and the j-th memory
accesses to the targeted LLC set:
Xj = tj − tj−1 (6.1)
For the sake of consistency, we define t0 = 0 to be the clock cycle at which the DNN
execution starts. Due to the randomness in tj’s, Xj’s are also random variables.
Let M(t) be the total number of times that the DNN accesses the targeted
LLC set up to cycle t, a.k.a.
M(t) = argmaxj{tj ≤ t} (6.2)
and its expected value be
m(t) = E[M(t)] (6.3)
Since the above-introduced random variables can characterize the DNN’s ac-
cess pattern to the targeted LLC set and the pattern is dependent on the DNN’s
structure, it is desirable for the attacker to obtain information about the value of
these variables. This can be done using Prime+Probe on the targeted LLC set.
Specifically, let us suppose that the attacker probes the targeted LLC set
every c clock cycles for a total of p probes. In each probe, every block in the
targeted set is accessed. Assuming a least-recently-used (LRU) replacement policy,
ideally, if the attacker accesses each block simultaneously, the LLC set will be filled
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entirely with the attacker’s data after each probe. The attacker measures the access
latency of each block of the set. Since a cache hit would be a much lower access
latency than a miss, the access latency will indicate whether the access was a cache
hit or miss and the two are very unlikely to be confused.
Let yk be the number of LLC misses the attacker observes in the k-th probe
(1 ≤ k ≤ p). Assuming that other processes running on the same computer have a
negligible probability of accessing the targeted LLC set between the (k−1)-th probe
and the k-th probe, the number of missed blocks in the targeted LLC set indicates
how many times the DNN has accessed this LLC set between time of the last probe,
(k − 1)c, and the time of the current probe, kc. Recall from Equation 6.2 that the
DNN makes M((k − 1)c)−M(kc) accesses to the targeted LLC set in this period.
Suppose the LLC is γ-way associative (i.e., there are γ blocks in the targeted LLC
set). Hence yk is capped by γ and can be expressed by
yk = min{γ,M(kc)−M((k − 1)c)} (6.4)
Let us call Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yp) the cache side-channel trace of a DNN. Y is
the cache side-channel information that can be directly observed from Prime+Probe.
Due to the randomness involved in the time of each access of the DNN, repeated
measurements of the cache side-channel are made so that the average of the traces
will be close to the expected value. Let Y be the set of traces obtained by repeated
Prime+Probe measurements. Y characterizes the memory access pattern, and hence
the structure, of the DNN.
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The above description holds for both the VDNN and the ADNN. In the rest of
this paper, we use superscripts “A” and “V ” to denote variables of the ADNN and
the VDNN, respectively, and use “A/V ” when an expression applies to both DNNs.
6.4.2 GANRED Components
The notation of some important components of GANRED framework are
explained as follows.
YV : the set of the VDNN’s cache side-channel traces. This serves as the
ground truth of the GANRED framework. The purpose of GANRED is to find a
structure of the ADNN that makes the ADNN produce identical cache side-channel
traces to YV .
Θ: the set of estimated dimension parameters of the ADNN. Recall that the
list of such parameters are listed in Table 6.1.
G(Θ): the generator that builds the ADNN with Θ and generates its cache
side-channel traces as follows. (1) The ADNN is constructed with dimension param-
eters Θ and random weights. (2) The ADNN is executed and its cache side-channel
trace is measured using Prime+Probe (i.e., in the same way that the VDNN is
sampled). (3) Step (2) is repeated multiple times in order to get a set of cache
side-channel traces. Hence, the output of G(Θ) is a set of cache side-channel traces
of the the ADNN, i.e., YA.
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D(YV ,YA): the discriminator that compares the VDNN’s traces, YV , with
the ADNN’s, YA. Recall that the length of each trace in YA/V is p. For each k such
that 1 ≤ k ≤ p, let ȳA/Vk be the average number of cache misses in the k-th probe of
ADNN/VDNN’s cache side-channel traces. The discriminator’s output, R, is also a
p-element vector, i.e., R = (r1, r2, . . . , rp). We call R the discriminator trace. rk
is an indicator of how well the two traces match at the k-th probe. For this purpose,
we could define rk the difference between the two average cache misses, i.e., |ȳAk −ȳVk |.
However, experiment data can be noisy and make the discriminator trace R noisy. So
instead, we take the two trace segments that are around the k-th probe of ADNN’s
average trace and VDNN’s average trace and define rk as the root-mean-square
difference of the two trace segments. This will serve the discriminator’s purpose
better.
The validator is another important component of GANRED. Details of the
validator are introduced in Sec. 6.4.4.
6.4.3 GANRED Framework
As a prerequisite of GANRED, the attacker repeatedly measures VDNN’s
cache side-channel using Prime+Probe and obtains a set of traces YV . YV is then
given to the GANRED framework, which takes the steps in Algorithm 6.1 to recover
the victim DNN structure. In essence, GANRED determines the structure of the
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Algorithm 6.1: GANRED Implementation
input : YV ; // VDNN’s cache side-channel trace
output: Θ ; // ADNN’s final dimension parameters
1 Initialization: l← 1, Θ← ∅, kl ← 0;
// l: estimated # layers in VDNN;
// k: the probe at which the traces starts to diverge
2 while kl < p do
3 l← l + 1;
4 θ∗l ← ∅ ; // tracking optimal parameters of one layer
5 k∗l ← kl−1 ; // kl according to the current θ∗
6 foreach θl ∈ Sl do
// Sl: the set of all feasible parameter combinations of
the l-th layer
7 Θ̂← Θ ∪ θl;
// Append enumerated parameters θl to existing parameters
Θ
8 R = (r1, r2, . . . , rp)← D(YV , G(Θ̂));
// Call the discriminator to compare traces of VDNN and
ADNN
9 k′l ← argmaxhr1, r2, . . . , rh < η;
// Given a threshold η, find how long the two sets of
traces match from beginning
10 if k′l > k
∗
l then
11 if validate(θl, kl−1, k
′
l) ==TRUE then
// TRUE indicates a successful validation.
Explained in Sec. 6.4.4
12 k∗l ← k′l;




17 Θ← Θ ∪ θ∗l ;
18 kl ← k∗l ;
19 end
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first layer before working on the second layer, determines the second before the third,
and so on, until the two DNN’s traces match entirely. We explain the procedure to
determine the structure of each layer of the ADNN in detail as follows.
Recall that the set of parameters that need to be found for each layer is listed
in Table 6.1. Notice that GANRED will work as long as the structure search space
of each layer is finite. In this work, without loss of generality, we define the structure
search space by the properties that state-of-the-art DNNs (e.g. AlexNet [52], the
VGG family [97], and ResNet [41]) have in common:
1. If the l-th layer is a convolutional layer, then the filter width 1 ≤ wfl ≤ 11,
the output depth doutl = 64×n where n is an integer and 1 ≤ n ≤ 32, and the
stride of convolution δl is 1 or 2.;
2. If the l-th layer is a fully connected layer, then the number of output neurons
zoutl = 2
n where n is an integer and 8 ≤ n ≤ 13.
Additionally, given that the user must provide input for and interpret output of
the DNN in order to use it, the input and output dimensions of the VDNN will
always be made available to the attacker. However, the attacker does not know the
type (convolutional or fully connected) of each layer or the number of layers int the
VDNN. Note that this is the same structure search space as considered by existing
attacks [123, 42].
Suppose that GANRED is looking for the structure of the l-th layer, which
means the first l − 1 layers’ structures have been determined. In this case, Θ
contains the ADNN’s parameters of the first l−1 layers. Let us use Sl to denote the
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structure search space of layer l. The attacker enumerates through this space. For
each structure within the search space, denoted as θl, an ADNN is constructed by
appending a layer with dimension parameters given in θl to the already-determined
l − 1 layers (with parameters in Θ).
The generator then measures this ADNN with Prime+Probe repeatedly to
obtain a set of cache side-channel traces, YA. The discriminator then compares
YA with YV and obtains the discriminator trace. Details of the generator and the
discriminator have been described in Sec. 6.4.2. Each element of the discriminator
trace is compared to a given threshold value η.
We say that the two traces match at probe k if rk < η. Let k
′
l be the last
probe before the discriminator trace rises beyond η or ends. In other words, for any
integer i within 1 ≤ i ≤ k′l, ri < η. Recall that the attacker probes the targeted
LLC set every c clock cycles. Hence the matching period stands for a time duration
of k′lc. We use kl−1 to denote the # of probes that the cache traces of the VDNN
match the trace of the ADNN without the l-th layer (i.e., the first l − 1 layers of
the ADNN with parameters in Θ).
If θl is the structure of the l-th layer that makes the two traces match for the
longest period so far, it has the potential to be the correct structure of layer l. There
is one caveat to be noticed. Due to the sequential nature of DNNs, the memory
accesses of one layer must all finish before the next layer’s accesses start. Therefore,
if θl has the correct parameters of the VDNN’s l-th layer, the added matching period
due to the l-th layer, i.e., k′lc − kl−1c, should be approximately the running time
of the l-th layer of both the VDNN and the ADNN. However, the attacker does
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not know which segment in the VDNN’s trace corresponds to the l-th layer. The
attacker can, though, verify whether the added matching period is close enough to
the theoretical running time of a layer with parameters in θl. This technique can
rule out θl if θl causes the ADNN’s traces to diverge from the VDNN’s traces in
the middle of ADNN’s execution. This is done by the validator. The details of how
the validator calculates the theoretical running time of a layer is introduced in Sec.
6.4.4.
The successfully validated structure of the l-th layer that makes the two DNN’s
traces match for the longest time is chosen as the final structure of the l-th layer. If
the two DNN’s traces still do not match for the entire p probes, the attacker uses
the same process to find the (l + 1)-th layer. If the p probes have all matched, the
ADNN’s dimension parameters Θ is considered as the result of the attack.
6.4.4 Validating Reverse Engineered Parameter Combina-
tions
During the reverse engineering of the l-th layer, if a structure denoted by θl
makes the ADNN’s traces and VDNN’s traces match for the longest, the validator
need to be invoked in order to verify whether θl is a “false positive” solution.
Specifically, the validator will find whether the ADNN’s traces deviate from the
VDNN’s in the middle of ADNN’s execution, which should note be the case for the
correct parameters of layer l. If the ADNN’s traces match the VDNN’s for kl−1
probes without layer l and k′l probes with layer l, then layer l (with parameters θl)
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makes the matched period increase by (k′l − kl−1)c clock cycles. This suggests that,
if θl contains the correct dimension parameters of the l-th layer, the running time
of the l-th layer is approximately (k′l − kl−1)c clock cycles.
The validator estimates the theoretical running time of a layer with parameters
θl based on the following observation: the execution time of a layer is linear in both
its number of multiply-and-accumulate (MAC) operations and the number of cache
misses. 1 Hence, the validator uses a linear regression analysis to estimate the
running time of a layer with parameters θl. Let t̂ be the estimated running time. t̂
is then compared to the increase in the length of matched period of the two DNNs’
traces, (k′l−kl−1)c. If the difference is below a certain threshold, then θl is accepted.
Otherwise, θl is deemed a “false positive” and rejected. The validator proves to
be an essential component of GANRED without which the correct structure of the
VDNNs cannot be found.
In the rest of this subsection, we present the details of the linear regression
process to estimate a layer’s running time.
6.4.4.1 Convolutional (Conv) Layers
The operation of a Conv layer is illustrated in Fig. 6.1. When a filter is
convolved with the input feature map (IFM), with each step that the filter moves, a
new output neuron is computed. We assume that only the new input neurons (i.e.,
that were not used in the last inner product) will result in cache misses. The number
1In Sec. 6.4.4, the notion of “cache misses” refers to the entire cache, not just the LLC set
selected by the Prime+Probe attack.
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of such new input neurons is fl · dinl · δl, where fl is the filter width, din is the IFM
depth, and δl is the convolution stride (see Table 6.1). We calculate the theoretical
number of cache misses of the Conv layer, denoted as uconv(θ), as the sum of two
components: (a) the total number of “new input neurons” as described above for
evaluating the entire OFM, and (b) the cache misses when each input neuron and
weight is used for the first time.












Since a cache miss results in significantly longer latency than a cache hit, the
number of cache misses will impact the Conv layer’s running time.
Let us use vconv(θl) to denote the # of MAC operations of a Conv layer, which
can be given by








In order to show that the running time of a Conv layer’s running time is
linear in both the # of cache misses and the # of MAC operations, we conduct
the following experiment. We take a population of Conv layers that is within our
structure search space and measured the running time of these layers. A linear
regression analysis is then conducted to verify the linearity. The regression shows
that the linear scores of both # of cache misses and # of MAC operations to the
running time are greater than 0.99 (1.0 is perfectly linear). In Fig. 6.3, we plot
the layers with equal # of MAC operations on the same line and show that a Conv
layer’s running time linearly increases in the theoretical # of cache misses. Let
t̂ = Âconvuconv(θl) + B̂
convvconv(θl) + Ĉ
conv be the regression result equation.
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# MAC ops = 4.62 * 108
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# MAC ops = 1.85 * 109
Figure 6.3: The linear relationship between Conv layer running time and theoretical cache
misses
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Figure 6.4: Linear regression on # MAC operations and trace length of an FC layer
6.4.4.2 Fully Connected (FC) Layers
In an FC layer, since there is no reuse of weights in the computation of different
output neurons, the number of MAC operations is proportional to the theoretical
number of cache misses. Therefore, we only look for the linear relationship between
an FC layer’s running time and the MAC operations. The # of MAC operations







Similar to the analysis for Conv layers, we select a population of FC layers from
the feasible structures and measure their running time. Then, a linear regression
is conducted on the # of MAC operations to the running time. A clear linear
relationship can be observed from Fig. 6.4 and we use t̂ = ÂFCvFC(θl) + B̂
FC to
denote the regression result.
6.4.5 Mathematical Justification of GANRED
As we have described in Sec. 6.4.3, GANRED reverse engineers the DNN in a
layer-by-layer manner. It must find the correct structure of the current layer before
moving on to the next layer. To this end, we intuitively assumed that when the
ADNN (with lA layers) has the same structure as the first lA layers of the VDNN
(which has lV layers in total, lV ≥ lA), then the ADNN’s cache side-channel traces
YA should match with the VDNN’s traces YV before the end of ADNN’s execution.
We justify this premise in this subsection. The following is assumed about a DNN’s
memory access:
1. The DNN layers are executed sequentially and hence the memory accesses of
a layer must be completed before the next layer’s memory accesses begin.
2. Each X
A/V
j , i.e., the time between the ADNN/VDNN’s (j − 1)-th and j-th
access to the targeted LLC set, is subject to a Gaussian distribution. For the
VDNN, XVj ∼ N (µj, σ2j ) where 1 ≤ j ≤ sV . If ADNN has the same structure











If ADNN has the same structure as the first lA layers of VDNN, the expected time at
which ADNN’s last access to the targeted LLC set would occur can be expressed as∑sA
j=1 µj. Our objective is then to prove that, in this case, the difference between the
cache side-channel traces of ADNN and VDNN before time
∑sA
j=1 µj can be upper
bounded by a small value. In order to prove this, we first bound the difference
between the two DNNs’ expected # of memory accesses up to time
∑sA
j=1 µj, i.e.,
|mV (t)−mA(t)|, as follows.
Theorem 6.1. If t <
∑sA






















Proof of Theorem 6.1. We first find the expression of mV (t)−mA(t) in terms of the
CDF of between-access time.
mA/V (t) =E[MA/V (t)] =
sA/V∑
j=1

















i ≤ t. Because all X’s are subject to independent Gaussian
distributions as described above, we have
t
A/V







Therefore, the probability of MA/V (t) ≤ j can be calculated via the CDF of the
above Gaussian distribution:






















































Since each integral is positive, we only need to prove mV (t) − mA(t) < U(t). In
Theorem 6.1, we specify that t <
∑sA
j=1 µj and. Let hj =
∑j
i=1 µi − t. Due to the
























































In each integral, since x >
∑j


















































































In order to illustrate that U(t) is an extremely value in a straightforward
manner, we estimate the parameters from a VDNN (AlexNet) and the ADNN with
the same structure as the first 2 layers of the VDNN. These parameters include
sA, sV , and µj. σj is assumed to be 20% of µj. Based on these parameters, U(t)
is plotted for the period close to the end of ADNN’s execution as shown in Fig.
6.5. We could only plot this period because U(t) monotonically increases in t as
t <
∑sA
j=1 µj and its value is so small before the plotted period that it is smaller
than the smallest positive number that a floating point number can represent.
Recall that yk is the number of observed LLC misses in the k-th probe and
was defined in Equation 6.4. yk stands for the cache side-channel information that
GANRED uses. The k-th probe will occur before the ADNN’s last access to the
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Figure 6.5: U(t) vs. t given typical parameters in Equation 6.8.
targeted LLC set if k <
∑sA
j=1 µj/c. The following theorem indicates that, if the
ADNN has the same structure as the first lA layers of the VDNN, then the two DNNs
should have very close cache side-channel traces as the probe index k <
∑sA
j=1 µj/c.
Theorem 6.2. If k <
∑sA
j=1 µj/c, then |E[yVk ]−E[yAk ]| is upper bounded by U(kc).
Proof of Theorem 6.2. By Theorem 6.1, we know that mV (kc) −mA(kc) < U(kc).
Note thatmV (kc)−mA(kc) can be expanded in the following way (note thatmA(0) =
mV (0) = 0):












(mV (ic)−mV ((i− 1)c))− (mA(ic)−mA((i− 1)c)
)
Let us first define q
A/V
k = m





(qVi − qAi ) < U(kc) (6.10)
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Note that qVk − qAk > 0 given any k. This is because qVk − qAk = [mV (kc)−mA(kc)]−
[mV ((k−1)c)−mA((k−1)c)] and, from Equation 6.9, it is clear that mV (t)−mA(t)
monotonically increases in t. Therefore, Equation 6.10 suggests that for any k that
satisfies 1 ≤ k <
∑sA
j=1 µj/c, we have q
V
k −qAk < U(kc), which is a necessary condition
that their summation is smaller than U(kc).
y
A/V
k = min{γ, q
A/V
k }. Since qVk > qAk , yVk ≥ yAk . Hence we only need to prove
E[yVk ]− E[yAk ] < U(kc).
E[yVk ]− E[yAk ] = E[yVk − yAk ]
=(γ − γ)Prob[yVk ≥ γ, yAk ≥ γ]+
(γ − yAk )Prob[yVk ≥ γ, yAk < γ]+
(yVk − yAk )Prob[yVk < γ, yAk < γ]
<0 + U(kc)Prob[yAk < γ]
<U(kc)
Hence proved
From Fig. 6.5, we know that U(kc) is a small value. The average number of
cache misses in each probe will converge to the expected number given a sufficient
number of repeated cache side-channel measurements. Therefore, if the ADNN has
the same structure as the first lA layers of the VDNN, the two DNNs will have very
close average cache side-channel traces before ADNN’s execution ends. This means
that comparing cache side-channel traces is a good way of determining whether the
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ADNN has correct parameters. Although it is still theoretically possible that two
DNNs with different structures have indistinguishable cache traces, the sensitivity
of cache traces to the structure makes this event rather unlikely.
6.5 Experiments
To evaluate the efficacy of the proposed GANRED framework, we have applied
it to reverse engineer several state-of-the-art DNN structures on a real server. In
our experiments, the VDNN is hosted on a Linux server which uses TensorFlow as
the machine learning framework. The attacker logs into the server without sudo
privilege. The APIs available to the attacker are those to construct the ADNN with
convolutional, fully connect, and pooling layers. The server has an Intel i7-7700
CPU which has an 8MB, 16-way associative last-level cache (LLC). Each cache
block contains 64 bytes (i.e., 6 bits block-offset). Hence there are 8192 associative
sets and the set index has 13 bits. The following practical challenges have been
addressed in our experiments.
(1) Having to probe each block in the targeted LLC set significantly limits the
frequency at which our attacker can probe the cache compared to a Flush+Reload
attacker [123, 42]. Nonetheless, we achieve more accurate reverse engineering results
than these attacks.
(2) The cache hit/miss result data has to be stored real-time but allocating another
array for data storage will result in cache interference. Hence, we store the hit/miss
result of each probe on the probed lines directly.
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In our experiments, we use GANRED to reverse engineer state-of-the-art
DNNs, including AlexNet [52] and the VGG family [97]. The generator repeatedly
measures the cache side-channel trace of each DNN for 50 times. Fig. 6.6 shows the
average cache side-channel traces of each VDNN and some traces of ADNNs that
GANRED determines as having the correct structure in the progress. We also show
the discriminator’s output trace when comparing these ADNNs with the VDNN. As
we can observe, these ADNNs’ traces match well with the VDNNs’ until the former
are about to end. This agrees with what we derived in Sec. 6.4.5. The discriminator
is able to capture the deviation as its output increases beyond the threshold η.
Figure 6.6: Upper images: the cache side-channel traces of AlexNet and VGG Nets and
some ADNNs with correct parameters in the progress of GANRED. Lower images: the
discriminator’s outputs corresponding to the ADNNs. X-axis: number of probes.
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In order to evaluate the performance of GANRED, we highlight the reduction
in DNN architecture search space. To this end, we estimate the size of the origi-
nal DNN structure search space (i.e., without side-channel information) using the
principles stated in Sec. 6.4.3 and assuming that the attacker knows the number of
layers in the DNN. Note that this is an underestimation, since the attacker under
our attack model does not know the number of layers and is thus facing an even
larger DNN structure search space.
6.5.1 Attack Results
For each VDNN, GANRED is able to recover the precise structure.
The # of possible structure of each VDNN benchmark and the attack results are
shown in Figure 6.7. Recall that GANRED also eliminates the need for code access
and shared main memory segments between the attacker and the victim. These
are substantial improvements over existing attacks. Our attack is also scalable:
the attack time increases linearly with the number of layers although the possible
structure space grows exponentially. The reason for the linear growth in attack
time is as follows. When reverse engineering any layer, the layer’s IFM dimensions
are always known, since the IFM is either the DNN’s input (public knowledge) or
the OFM of last layer (determined in the last layer). Since the same structure
constraints apply to any layer, the number of ADNNs that need to be constructed
and measured is the same. Hence the time spent on reverse engineering each layer
is roughly the same.
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Figure 6.7: GANRED attack results
6.6 Summary
In this work, we develop GANRED, a GAN-based DNN structure reverse
engineering framework which utilizes cache timing side-channel information. Unlike
prior reverse engineering approaches which required shared library code in the main
memory and other resources that may be unrealistic, our attack uses Prime+Probe
and thus only requires minimal resources. GANRED compares the VDNN’s cache
side-channel trace with that of ADNN with estimated structure and converges when
the two traces become identical. Experiments show that the precise structure of
each VDNN benchmark has been found and the attack complexity scales linearly
with the number of layers in VDNN. Therefore, we conclude that our attack is
successful and scalable. The fundamental reason that GANRED produces more
accurate results than existing attacks [123, 42] may be that the cache side-channel
information used by GANRED inherently contains more information. Those existing
attacks monitors certain library function calls, which only accounts for a tiny portion
of DNN’s memory access. In contrast, the cache side-channel traces measured by
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GANRED contains information about the DNN’s overall memory pattern. Such
an attack method must be considered when the intellectual property of a DNN is
concerned.
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Chapter 7: Mitigating Reverse
Engineering Attacks on Neural Networks
In Chapter 6, we studied the reverse engineering of DNNs via cache side-
channel information. In this chapter, we consider a much strong attacker and pro-
pose a countermeasure. Instead of only observing some side-channels, the attacker
now has the complete knowledge of the DNN’s memory access pattern, based on
which she can reverse engineer the DNN structure much more easily. In order to de-
fend such an attack, we propose a defensive memory access mechanism which utilizes
oblivious shuffle, address space layout randomization, and dummy memory accesses
to counter such attacks. Experiments show that our defense exponentially increases
the attack complexity with asymptotically lower memory access overhead compared
to generic memory obfuscation techniques such as oblivious RAM (ORAM) and is
scalable to larger DNNs.
7.1 Introduction
It has been shown that the DNN structure can be easily reverse engineered
if the memory access pattern of the processor running the DNN is leaked [43].
This is a significant security concern. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no
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efficient countermeasure has been proposed. Although applying an oblivious RAM
(ORAM) protocol is a well-established approach to hide the memory access pattern,
it comes with very high memory access overheads [100, 78, 3]. Because running
DNNs is a memory intensive task, the speed of the DNN running in hardware is
mostly constrained by the number of memory accesses [21, 22, 134]. This makes
ORAM-based memory access obfuscation impractical for DNNs.
Oblivious shuffle also provably obfuscates the address space with lower over-
head than ORAM albeit with weaker theoretical guarantees [71] (detailed in Section
7.3). In this chapter, we utilize oblivious shuffle to obfuscate a subset of the
memory access patterns. The subset itself is customizable by the designer. A
bigger subset (which could at most include the entire memory space) results in
stronger obfuscation at the cost of higher memory access overheads. In addition, we
use address space layout randomization (ASLR) on the entire memory space and
add dummy memory access (DumMA) requests to the shuffled addresses for further
improvements in security guarantees.
The contribution of this chapter is as follows:
• A novel defense strategy to obfuscate the processor’s memory access pattern
is proposed in order to reduce information leakage about the structure of the
DNN being executed. This strategy utilizes three techniques: oblivious shuf-
fle, address space layout randomization (ASLR), and dummy memory access
(DumMA). Although these techniques have been existing, our innovation lies
in combining them strategically to thwart the attack with low overhead.
145
• A modified attack based on that in [43] is formulated to reverse engineer the
DNN structure in the presence of our defense in order to evaluate the security
of our defense.
• Experimental results show that the complexity of the modified attack is very
high thereby demonstrating the effectiveness of our defense.
• It is also shown that the memory access overhead of our defense is very low
and does not increase with the DNN depth, making our approach scalable to
deeper models.
7.2 Attack Model
The recent work of Hua, Zhang, and Suh [43] illustrates an elegant optimiza-
tion theoretic attack based on the memory access side-channels of systems running
DNNs. The attack model considered is as follows. The owner of the DNN model
wants to enable the user to run the model on her own processor (e.g. a CPU,
GPU, or DNN accelerator) without exposing the structure of the DNN model. The
attacker is considered to be the user who is honest-but-curious, i.e., she wants to
know the details of the model but does not interfere with the normal execution of
the DNN model. The processor is considered as secure, i.e., the attacker cannot
observe or interfere with the processor’s internal operations.
However, the attacker is able to observe the memory access patterns of the
processor, i.e., a transcript of its memory accesses including the accessed addresses,
the access types (i.e., read or write), and the time of each access. The attacker also
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knows the input and output of the DNN (since she has I/O access to the DNN).
As shown in [43], a reverse engineering attack can be formulated under this attack
model and the architecture of a DNN can be extracted.
7.2.1 Attack Setup
The specific type of deep neural networks (DNN) of interest to us is convolution
neural networks. These networks comprise two types of layers: convolutional
(Conv) layers and fully connected (FC) layers. If a pooling layer exists following
a Conv layer, then we count it as a part of the Conv layer, as is consistent with
Chapter 6. Each layer transforms a set of input neurons, called the input feature
map (IFM), into a set of output neurons, called the output feature map (OFM).
The OFM of the previous layer is the IFM of the next layer. Figure 6.1 illustrates the
structure of a Conv layer. The structure of a Conv layer can be described by a set of
hyper-parameters which are listed in Table 7.1. 1 The structure of a fully connected
layer is much simpler. If layer i is an FC layer, its IFM and OFM are vectors of
length zini and z
out





transforms the IFM to the OFM.
As in the attack model of [43], the DNN model is stored in a virtual address
space that starts from 1 and each neuron or weight takes exactly 1 address to store.
The way that the neurons and weights are aligned in the memory is as follows: The
first feature map (i.e., the IFM of layer 0, of size zin0 ) starts from address 1 and
1Table 7.1 includes more parameters than Table 6.1 since we deal with a stronger attack whose
result is not confined to any specific family of DNNs in this chapter.
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i width of the IFM/OFM of layer i
dini , d
out





i size of IFM/OFM/filter of layer i
Pi indicator of whether pooling exists in layer i
fconvi , f
pool
i filter width of convolution/pooling (if existing) of layer i
sconvi , s
pool
i stride of convolution/pooling (if existing) of layer i
pconvi , p
pool
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for following layers
Figure 7.1: Illustration of the attack in [43] per Section 7.2.2.
ends at zin0 . The second feature map (the OFM of layer 0 and the IFM of layer 1,
of size zout0 which equals z
in
1 ) starts at z
in
0 + 1, and so on. The weights are stored in
a separate area of memory and organized in a layer-by-layer configuration (similar
to the neurons).
7.2.2 Attack Methodology
The attack to reverse engineer the structure of a DNN consists of 3 phases:
determining the layer boundaries in the memory traces, solving for the feasible DNN
structures which fit the memory trace, and training each feasible structure for the
best match.
148
Phase 1: In this phase, the attacker determines the layer boundaries in the
memory access transcript leaked by side-channels and obtains the IFM, OFM, and
filter sizes of each layer. This process is illustrated in Figure 7.1.
The layer boundaries are expressed in terms of the clock cycles at which
the first memory access of each layer occurs. Let ci, i ∈ [L] be the first clock cycle
of layer i where L is the number of layers. The attacker determines the boundaries
between layers by observing the first occurrence of read-after-write (RAW) in
the memory. This is illustrated in Figure 7.1(a). Layer 0 writes its OFM to the
memory and layer 1 needs to read the same memory location to get it as its IFM.
Therefore, the first occurrence of RAW indicates that layer 0 has finished and layer
1 has started, thereby leaking c1 (Figure 7.1(b)). In this way, by counting how
many addresses have been written to before c1, the attacker observes the OFM size
of layer 0 zout0 (Figure 7.1(b)). Similarly, the attacker can also observe the filter
size of layer 0 zf0 . The first RAW of layer 1’s OFM marks the beginning of layer 2
(Figure 7.1(c)). By repeating the above procedure for all the subsequent layers, the
IFM sizes, OFM sizes, filter sizes, the starting clock cycles of all the following layers
can be observed.
Phase 2: After obtaining feature map and filter sizes in the previous phase,
the attacker tries to obtain all the feasible structures of the DNN that conform with
the observed access pattern. Each structure is described by a combination of the
hyper-parameters of every layer (as listed in Table 7.1). These hyper-parameters are
obtained by solving an integer feasibility program (IFP) problem that captures
the relationship among the hyper-parameters for each layer with the information
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2 × dini , zouti = (wouti )2 × douti (7.1)
zf = (f convi )




+ 1 + P (ppooli − f
pool
i )
spooli × P + P̄
(7.3)

















Phase 3: After all the feasible structures are obtained, the attacker trains
each structure and picks the one with the highest accuracy as the final outcome.
It was shown in [43] that the feasible structures obtained from the memory traffic
were very few thereby significantly reducing the training effort.
7.2.3 Attack Complexity and Practicality
In this work, we consider 4 DNN benchmarks which are listed in Table 7.2.
The complexity of the attack is measured using two metrics: the number of IFP
problems solved and the total number of feasible DNN structures. The former
represents the hardness involved with obtaining the set of feasible DNN structures
(essentially the complexity of Phase 2). The latter represents the amount of training
effort needed by the attacker to pick the best model (essentially Phase 3).
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Table 7.2: Benchmark DNNs and attack complexity using the attack in [43]
Benchmark
input # layers attack complexity metrics
win0 d
in
0 Conv FC Total # IFPs solved # feasible structures
DNN 1 28 1 2 2 4 4 4
DNN 2 32 1 3 2 5 5 6
DNN 3 32 3 4 3 7 8 1
DNN 4 64 3 5 3 8 9 8
We wrote a simulator to generate a processor’s memory trace. The processor’s
memory trace is reverse engineered using the above-described attack method. The
complexity of the attacks on the benchmark DNNs is also shown in Table 7.2. As
seen, both metrics are low for all the benchmarks, indicating the low complexity of
the attack.
It is important to note that the “exact” neural network with exactly the same
weights and topology may not be the one synthesized by this attack. However,
the attacker’s objective would still be achieved since she would still be able to get
substantially accurate classification performed by synthesizing the model based on
the one running on the processor.
7.3 Cryptographic Preliminaries
The effectiveness of the above-mentioned attack necessitates a defense mech-
anism that reduces the information leakage of the DNN structure in the memory
access patterns. Hiding memory access patterns is a well-studied problem and has
been formalized via the notion of Oblivious RAM (ORAM) schemes. An ORAM
scheme can be used to obfuscate the memory access patterns of any input RAM
program and provides the strong theoretical guarantee that the obfuscated memory
access patterns reveal no information about the input program [80]. However, even
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the state-of-the-art ORAM protocol [100, 78, 3] incurs an access overhead of
Ω(logN), i.e., the average number of memory accesses that have to be performed
in order to access a single address in the original program is at least logN , where
N is the total number of address.
In our work, instead of ORAMs, we consider a different approach called
oblivious shuffle whose overhead is much lower [34]. We define oblivious shuffle
below followed by an explanatory example.
Definition 7.1 (Oblivious Shuffle). A shuffle algorithm is an algorithm of the form
(Enc(π(A)), α) ← Shuffle(A,Enc, π) where A is an input array, Enc is a secure
encryption algorithm, and π is a random, predetermined permutation function.
The output of Shuffle is an encryption of the permutation of A according to π
and a memory access transcript α. The Shuffle algorithm is an oblivious shuffle if α
is independent of π.
Algorithm 7.1: A simple oblivious shuffle example
1 for i in [N ] do
2 Read address i for A[i] and store A[i] in the secure on-chip memory of
the processor
3 end
4 for i in [N ] do
5 Write Enc(A[π−1(i)]) to address i
6 end
A simple oblivious shuffle algorithm is shown in Algorithm 7.1. Using this
algorithm, the attacker will always see the same memory access pattern regardless
of π, which, in this case, is a read sequence followed by a write sequence, both
in the address order of 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. Hence the attacker cannot decipher π.
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Reference [71] proposed the state-of-the-art oblivious shuffle algorithm, called the
Melbourne shuffle, which is efficient and scalable: it only requires O(
√
N) private
memory (i.e., the memory not observable to the attacker) to shuffle an array of size
O(N) as proven in Theorem 5.1 in [71].
In this work, the permutation function π we choose ‘looks’ random and utilizes
the internal randomness of the processor (which is fixed for the same shuffle but can
vary for different shuffles). Similar to the above example, the attacker will also see
a fixed memory access pattern α of Melbourne shuffle regardless of π.
Under this condition, if a processor is running a DNN model and switches
between Melbourne shuffle phases and regular DNN phases, there will be three types
of phases in the memory access pattern: (i) the Melbourne shuffle, (ii) the DNN
accesses inside the shuffled addresses, and (iii) the DNN access outside the shuffled
addresses. The attacker can distinguish these phases because, no matter what
memory access pattern is generated by the DNN application, that of the Melbourne
shuffle will always be α. The attacker can hence also observe the addresses that
are shuffled. Note, however, that the attacker has no information about π, or the
actual memory addresses accessed by the DNN application during type (ii) phases
since she does not know the internal randomness of the processor, nor does α leak
any information of π.
Running DNNs is a memory-intensive task where every neuron and weight
needs to be accessed. To compare the memory access overhead of ORAM and that of
the Melbourne shuffle, we take an array A of length N and require that every element
in A be accessed once. With ORAM, the total # accesses will be Ω(N logN). With
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Melbourne shuffle, the memory accesses consists of two parts: those of the shuffle and
those of the actual accesses. The Melbourne shuffle takes O(N) memory accesses.
Unlike the ORAM, once the oblivious shuffle is completed, there is no additional
access overhead: one simply needs to access the new address. Hence the total #
accesses will be O(N) + N = O(N). The overhead of the Melbourne shuffle is
therefore a constant multiplicative factor, making it asymptotically lower than that
of the ORAM.
7.4 Defense Methodology
In this section, we propose a memory access strategy for processors to run
DNN models with minimal leakage of structural information. The defense should
fulfill two competing objectives:
• The resulting attack complexity should be very high.
• The memory access overhead should be low.
As discussed in Sec. 7.3, using ORAM will satisfy the first objective but fail the
second one. In order to achieve both objectives, our proposed defense strategy
utilizes 1) the Melbourne shuffle , 2) address space layout randomization (ASLR) [31],
and 3) adding dummy memory accesses (DumMA). A modified attack based on [43]
to find the feasible structures of the DNN is also formulated in order to evaluate the
security of our defense.
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7.4.1 Utilizing Oblivious Shuffle
In order to obfuscate all the layer boundaries, a DNN with L layers needs L−1
oblivious shuffles (one for each layer boundary) during its execution. Note that we
do not need to shuffle the entire memory: in the i-th shuffle, only the memory
addresses accessed near ci need to be shuffled (recall that ci is the clock cycle at the
beginning of layer i). Varying the number of shuffled addresses enables us to explore
a spectrum of trade-offs between the memory access overhead and the security of the
defense. In this subsection, we present how to determine when and where to shuffle
and model the attacker’s knowledge based on the new memory access pattern.
7.4.1.1 Oblivious Shuffle Strategy
We use the following method to determine where and when to shuffle. For the
reasons described in Section 7.3, we assume a strong attacker who can distinguish
whether an access is a regular DNN-based request vs. a Melbourne shuffle request.
Note that this assumption only strengthens the attacker and therefore designs in this
threat model yield more secure strategies. In our explanation below, we express the
timescale in terms of the clock cycles in the original memory access pattern (such as
in Figure 7.1) and ignore the clock cycles that are spent on Melbourne shuffle as if
it is done instantly. In the rest of this paper, all the mentions of “memory accesses”











































Figure 7.2: Illustration of oblivious shuffle in the memory access pattern of a DNN. The
variables that are observable to the attacker are also illustrated.
Step 1: determining the shuffle budget. In order to control the memory access
overhead of the Melbourne shuffle, we shuffle at most 2bs addresses in each shuffle.
bs is called the shuffle budget.
In order to obfuscate ci, all the memory addresses that are accessed within a
certain range of clock cycles containing ci are obfuscated using Melbourne shuffle. To
this end, we determine the above-mentioned clock cycle range with an upper bound




i , respectively. We take ĉ
l
i ∼ U(ci−2bs , ci)
and cli = dĉlie where U stands for the uniform distribution (assuming there is at most
one memory access per clock cycle). Let cui = bcli + 2bsc. This makes sure that the
total # memory address accessed from cli to c
u
i does not exceed 2
bs .
All the memory addresses that are accessed within [cli, c
u
i ] are to be shuffled.
We illustrate this in Figure 7.2 to which we encourage the readers to refer as the
explanation proceeds. We call the set of shuffled memory addresses at cli the shuffled
regime i, which include sini input neurons addresses, s
out
i output neurons addresses,
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swti weight addresses, and a set of additional addresses.These additional addresses
are randomly chosen and can be any address in the memory space allocated for the
DNN, as shown in Figure 7.2. This padding action will also enable us to add dummy
accesses in the shuffled regimes to improve security as will be shown later.
Step 3: choosing the permutation π. Although the Melbourne shuffle will not
leak information about π, π should ‘look’ random enough in order to obfuscate
the memory accesses within the shuffled regimes. In addition, π must be easy to
compute, otherwise we would spend too much time computing π. To meet these
requirements, we use the Feistel-based format-preserving encryption [7] algorithm
for π.
7.4.1.2 Information Leakage
We model the attacker’s best-case knowledge in order to analyze the worst-case
security guarantees. As noted before, we assume a strong attacker who can tell the
difference between a Melbourne shuffle access and a regular DNN access. Therefore,
cli and the addresses within the shuffled regime i are known to the attacker. She
can also infer cui since after c
u
i , the memory accesses of the DNN will come out of
the shuffled regime. As described in Section 7.2, by default, the neurons are stored
in consecutive addresses and the weights too. In line with the best-for-the-attacker
principle, we assume that each kind of memory access (i.e., neuron read, neuron
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write, or weight read) within each shuffled regime is of consecutive addresses. In
this case, by calculating the difference of accessed addresses before cli and after c
u
i ,
the attacker is able to infer sini , s
out
i , and s
wt
i .
The memory access pattern outside the shuffled regimes are directly visible to
the attacker. Let nini , n
wt
i , and n
out
i denote the # read neurons, # read weights, and
# written neurons, respectively, between clock cycle cui + 1 and c
l
i+1− 1 (essentially
the region between two adjacent shuffled regimes, note that in this region layer
i is active) as illustrated in Figure 7.2. Let ŝini and ŝ
wt
i be the # shuffled input
neurons and weights in the shuffled regime i, respectively, that are accessed before
ci (i.e., belong to layer i− 1). In order to find all feasible structures of layer i, the
attacker needs to enumerate all the possible (integer) combinations of ci ∈ [cli, cui ]
and ci+1 ∈ [cli+1, cui+1] (since she does not know exactly where the ci, ci+1 lie within
these boundaries). Let rt2t1 and w
t2
t1 be the # read and written addresses, respectively,











i − nini − (sini − ŝini ) ≥ 0 (7.9)
ŝwti+1 = z
f
i − nwti − (swti − ŝwti ) ≥ 0 (7.10)
Equation (7.7) states that the total # read addresses between the layer boundaries
is equal to the summation of the IFM size and the filter size. Similarly, (7.8)
is based on the fact that the OFM is the only thing that is written back to the
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memory. Equations (7.9) and (7.10) are because the read accesses of each layer
consist of 3 parts: (a) those in the previous shuffled regime (i), (b) those that are
not shuffled, and (c) those in the current shuffled regime (i + 1), and those in (c)
must be non-negative.
Equations (7.7) through (7.10) gives the possible combinations of zouti and
zfi . Each possible combination is plugged in the IFP problem in Equations (7.1)
through (7.6). The more possible combinations of zouti and z
f
i , the more IFPs to be
solved and hence the greater attack complexity. In order to increase the # possible
combinations and hence attack complexity, we propose to use ASLR and DumMA
to relax the constraints on zouti and z
f
i imposed by Equations (7.7) through (7.10).
7.4.2 Address Space Layout Randomization
ASLR was initially proposed to counter the buffer overflow attack [31]. In
our work, ASLR is only done once at compile time to randomize the entire memory
space. Each address is permuted using a permutation function πinit which maps
an address addr to be initially stored in address πinit(addr). We use the same type
of algorithm for πinit as the π for the Melbourne shuffle. In this way, the access
pattern even outside the shuffled regimes will look random and the continuity of
the address space is broken. Therefore, the attacker is not able to infer nini , n
out
i ,
or nwti . As a result, Equations (7.9) and (7.10), which require these variables, are
not applicable any more. In this way, the constraints on zouti and z
f
i are reduced to




i and hence force the attack to solve more IFPs. Note that ASLR does
not increase the number of memory accesses at run time since it works only as a
mapping from the requested address to the actual address. Also note that ASLR
just by itself does not mitigate the RAW type attack and needs to be combined with
oblivious shuffle.
7.4.3 Dummy Memory Accesses
In this technique, we add dummy memory access within the shuffled regimes.
When dummy memory accesses (DumMA) exist in the shuffled regimes, the attacker
cannot tell a real access from a dummy one. However, she still gets an upper bound
of # real read/write addresses since they must not exceed the total # read/write
addresses (i.e., real+dummy). One question is how many dummy accesses should
be added. This is answered as follows. Since repeated accesses to the same address
of the same type are observable, these accesses will not increase the upper bound of
# real read/write addresses and do not improve the level of obfuscation. Therefore,
there is no need to add more dummy accesses when every address in the shuffled
regime is both read and written once.
7.4.3.1 DumMA Without ASLR
In this case, the attacker is able to infer each type of shuffled addresses: sini ,
souti , and s
wt




i . For this reason, Equations (7.9)
and (7.10) still hold. However, Equations (7.7) and (7.8) need to be changed to
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reflect the “upper bound” effect caused by DumMA: the # of reads and writes














Compared to Equations (7.7) and (7.8), (7.11) and (7.12) change equalities
to inequalities (with the equal sign), and thus increasing the possible combinations
of zouti and z
f
i .
7.4.3.2 DumMA With ASLR
Due to ASLR, Equations (7.9) or (7.10) does not hold any more for the
same reason as described in Sec. 7.4.2. zouti and z
f
i are hence only constrained
by Equations (7.11) and (7.12).
7.4.4 Summary of Defense Techniques
Three techniques have been introduced in the formulation of our defense:
oblivious shuffle (OS), address space layout randomization (ASLR), and dummy
memory accesses (DumMA). Each OS obfuscates the accessed memory addresses
within a certain range of clock cycles containing a layer boundary. The following
information remains leaked to the attacker: (i) the nature of each memory access
outside the shuffled regimes, (ii) the # shuffled input neurons sini , output neurons
souti , and weights s
wt
i in each shuffled regime, and (iii) the (actual) # read and
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Table 7.3: Information leaked under various combinations of defense techniques
Techniques

















OS Yes Exact (7.7) ∼ (7.10)
OS + ASLR No Exact (7.7), (7.8)
OS + DumMA Yes Upper bound (7.9) ∼ (7.12)
All the above No Upper bound (7.11), (7.12)
written addresses of the DNN model. (i) and (ii) are obfuscated by ASLR and (iii)
by DumMA. The information leakage under four cases is summarized in Table 7.3:
OS only, OS + ASLR, OS + DumMA, and OS + ASLR + DumMA.
7.4.5 Attacking the Proposed Defense
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the attacker knows which defense tech-
niques are in place and is able to attack accordingly. The new attack of layer i is
shown using the procedure shown in Algorithm 7.2.
Algorithm 7.2: Procedure to reverse engineer layer i in the new attack
1 for (ci, ci+1) ∈ [cli, cui ]× [cli+1, cui+1] do
2 for Each feasible structure of layer i− 1 ending at ci − 1 do
3 Find all the possible combinations of zo and zf according to the
equations summarized in Table 7.3;
4 for Each possible (zo, zf ) pair do
5 Solve the IFP defined by Equations (7.1) through (7.6).
Concatenate all the found feasible structures of layer i to the




When Algorithm 7.2 finishes for the last layer, all the feasible structures of the
DNN will be obtained.
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Figure 7.3: # IFPs solved and # feasible structures of the DNN benchmarks under various
defense techniques
7.5 Experiments and Results
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed defense strat-
egy using the complexity of the modified attack and measure the memory access
overhead. The attack complexity is evaluated in the same way as described in
Section 7.2.3, with the two metrics being the number of IFP problems (defined by
Equations (7.1) ∼ (7.6)) (Phase 2) to be solved and the total number of feasible
DNN structures that need to be trained and evaluated (Phase 3).
The shuffle budget bs ranges from 6 to 9 in our experiments. Under each bs,
we generate the memory traces for each combination of defense techniques. When
DumMA is used, we add dummy accesses into each shuffled regime such that each
shuffled address is both read once and written once.
The two complexity metrics of the 4 benchmarks are reported in Figure 7.3.
We observe that the combination of all three techniques yields the highest security
level:
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Table 7.4: The overhead of our proposed defense
Benchmark bs = 6 bs = 7 bs = 8 bs = 9
DNN 1
Without DumMA 4.10% 10.89% 10.94% 33.63%
With DumMA 4.36% 11.35% 12.07% 35.21%
DNN 2
Without DumMA 8.85% 25.20% 36.24% 86.66%
With DumMA 9.31% 26.44% 37.95% 87.58%
DNN 3
Without DumMA 2.38% 3.72% 9.03% 16.42%
With DumMA 2.49% 3.99% 9.41% 17.16%
DNN 4
Without DumMA 1.12% 1.83% 5.18% 13.97%
With DumMA 1.76% 3.12% 6.79% 17.41%
Average
Without DumMA 4.11% 10.41% 15.35% 37.67%
With DumMA 4.48% 11.23% 16.56% 39.34%
1. Both metrics are many orders of magnitude better than any other combination
of techniques within the same benchmark and under the same shuffle budget.
2. For each benchmark, both metrics grow exponentially with the shuffle budget.
3. The # possible structures tend to grow exponentially as the DNN gets deeper.
The overheads of our proposed defense under each shuffle budget from 6 to
9 are listed in Table 7.4. As seen, very high attack complexity can be achieved
at the cost of low access overheads. Moreover, the memory access overhead does
not increase when the DNN gets larger, making our technique easily scalable to
larger DNN models. This is because the overhead is roughly determined by the
ratio of the size of each shuffled regime to that of each layer. This scalability is a
key advantage of our approach over ORAM. ORAM requires an Ω(logN)(×100%)
access overhead where N is the size of the memory (and must be least the size of the
DNN), which means that the access overhead must increase as the DNN becomes
larger. The effectiveness and scalability of our defense strategy make it practical to
defend the reverse engineering attacks on DNNs. Note that the secure encryption
algorithms (for which we use AES) and the permutation function π (which is a simple
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transformation from AES) are not considered as significant sources of overheads
because AES accelerators have been integrated into most processor architectures
nowadays which allow very efficient computation of AES functions.
7.6 Summary
A novel defense strategy against the reverse engineering on DNNs is proposed
in this chapter. The targeted attack model analyzes the memory access pattern of
the processor running the DNN and solves an integer feasibility program to obtain
all the possible structures of each layer. In our defense strategy, three techniques are
utilized to obfuscate the memory access pattern, including oblivious shuffle, address
space layout randomization, and dummy memory access. A modified attack based on
the original attack is also formulated in order to evaluate the security of the proposed
defense. Experiments show that, by combining all the three defense techniques, very
high attack complexity can be achieved with low overheads. It is also shown that
our defense approach easily scales to larger DNN models. Therefore, we conclude
that the DNN reverse engineering attacks based on memory access patterns can be
effectively countered using our proposed defense approach.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Future
Research Directions
In this dissertation, we studied the security vulnerabilities and opportunities
in various emerging technologies. In Chapter 2, we explored the opportunities to
enhance IC supply chain security brought by double patterning lithography (DPL).
In Chapter 3, we formulated an optimization-theoretic attack against physical un-
clonable functions (PUF). From Chapter 4 to Chapter 7, we investigated multiple
security issues in which neural networks were involved. In Chapter 4, we identified
the security threats of neural Trojans, i.e., hidden malicious functionalities in neural
network IPs, and proposed effective countermeasures. In Chapter 5, we studied the
ramifications of the inherent error resiliency of neural network-based applications
on logic locking. Specifically, we proved the unavoidable trade-off between security
and effectiveness among all logic locking schemes and found that, in the presence of
such error resiliency, no existing logic locking scheme can achieve the two competing
objectives at the same time. Hence we developed Strong Anti-SAT (SAS), a novel
logic locking scheme that magnifies hardware module-level error to the application
level while maintaining exponentially high SAT attack complexity, thus achieving
the two goals simultaneously. Chapters 6 and 7 discussed side-channel-based neural
network reverse engineering attacks and defenses, respectively. In Chapter 6, we
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proposed GANRED, a novel cache side-channel attack to reverse engineer deep
neural networks. Unlike existing attacks, GANRED does not need code access or
shared maim memory content with the victim, but achieved more accurate results
nevertheless. In Chapter 7, we consider an even stronger attacker model where s/he
has access to the entire memory access record of the neural network. We proposed
a countermeasure using oblivious shuffle, address space layout randomization, and
dummy memory access. Experiments show that the countermeasure exponentially
increases the number of feasible network structures found by the attack.
8.1 Future Work
There are many new research directions that can be extended from the security
issues we have studied in this paper. We summarize these directions in the rest of
this chapter.
8.1.1 Security Opportunities in 3D IC
3D IC is another emerging semiconductor technology which stacks multiple
silicon dice together to form complete circuitry. Along with significant performance
gains, this physical structure provides many unique opportunities that may benefit
its security. For example, the top layer is a natural shield of probing or various
side-channels for the lower layers. It also enables split manufacturing, where each
layer is manufactured in a separate foundry. In this case, an approach to determine
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how to split the circuitry onto different dice that resembles our proposal in Chapter
2 may be developed in order to minimize the information leakage about the entire
design.
8.1.2 Architecture and Application Aware Logic Locking
In Chapter 5, we emphasized that a logic locking scheme must corrupt the
application running on the protected hardware when a wrong key is applied. This
is because, if locking has no application-level effects, a pirated/overbuilt copy of the
chip will simply be as good as an authentic chip. Although there have been a myriad
of logic locking techniques, most of them are focused on the module level. However,
in order to derail an application from its correct behavior when a wrong key is
present, the locking induced error must be propagated from the locked module to
the processor’s architecture and then to the application. Such propagation should be
taken into consideration when deciding deciding the locking scheme and the location
in the place to lock.
8.1.3 Hardware-Neural Network Co-Design for Security
Both the protection of neural models from hardware side-channel attacks and
the hardware security challenges brought by neural network-based applications have
been studied in this dissertation. In order to address all these issues simultaneously,
a neural network-hardware co-design framework would be desirable. For example,
let us consider the following scenario where the hardware designer collaborates with
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the neural model owner to protect both the hardware and the neural model. The
hardware designer implements a key-dependent operation in the hardware and the
neural model owner trains the model with the knowledge of the key. Without
the correct key, no unauthorized copy of the hardware can run the neural network
correctly, nor can the end user decipher the neural model. Detailed protocols and
implementations to this end can make interesting research topics.
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